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ABSTRACT 
 
 Target based decision making occurs when a decision maker wishes to maximize the 
probability of attaining some output or performance level.  The target may be set externally, for 
example, by an employer as part of an incentive system. Or, the target may simply be based on a 
decision maker’s individual goals and understanding of implicit expectations. Questions arise 
concerning the effects of these decisions on the performance of an organization. Further, if these 
decisions affect organizational value, how well can these decisions be characterized and 
predicted? This research explores these questions—and others—using both theoretical and 
experimental means.  
 A value gap model is developed that facilitates simulation based insights to target 
optimality. The effect of a target is characterized in terms of a value gap that is defined as the 
difference in value between what was selected based on a target and what the organization would 
have preferred. A copula based method is used to simulate future decision situations and the 
expected value gap is calculated as a function of model parameters. Several trends in target 
optimality are observed that are robust to changes in the probability distributions over future 
decision alternatives. Specifically, the optimal target (i) decreases as the organization’s risk 
aversion increases, (ii) increases as the number of available alternatives increase, and (iii) the 
presence of an efficient frontier of decision alternatives reduces the consequences of setting 
targets higher than optimal.  
 A behavioral experiment is conducted to compare target-based decision making to 
decisions in the absence of a target. The results show that while target based decision making can 
be well predicted based on the properties of the decision alternatives alone. Decisions in the 
absence of a target, however, cannot be predicted based on the alternatives alone. Information 
about individualized differences in risk preferences is required to identify trends in the decision 
making behavior. These results have strong implications for decisions about whether or not to 
used target based incentives within an organization.  
 The research concludes with an application to engineering systems and a discussion of 
additional questions raised by the research that point to directions for new research.  
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1.    INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1.      Motivation 
The 2008 financial crisis has been blamed on excessive risk-taking taking by Wall Street 
and the global financial industry (FCIC 2011, Chan 2011).  Such a causal link begs the question 
of why this risk-taking occurred in the first place. In the United States, this question was 
examined by the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission which laid blame on ineffective 
government regulation and policies as well as corporate mismanagement and greed (FCIC 2011, 
Chan 2011). One aspect of corporate management that has garnered a particular interest among 
the public is the issue of bonus pay for bankers. This issue has become notorious due to reports 
of large bonuses for bankers whose institutions received government bailout money (Bass and 
Beamish 2008, Story and Dash 2009). The role that risk-taking played in the financial crisis 
motivates a close examination of how financial incentives affect decision making. 
To understand the effect of incentives, it is important to first understand how those 
incentives are structured. In the banking industry, the way bonuses are calculated has changed 
significantly over the years with many of the changes occurring as a result of the 2008 crisis. In 
the past, bonuses were mostly cash payments that were a function of seniority and performance 
(Roose 2012). Today, the calculation of bonus payments is much more complicated. Banks often 
rely on compensation consultants to provide insider information on bonus pay of their 
competitors for that year before determining their own incentive payments (Roose 2012). In spite 
of the complexity in the composition and calculation of bonus payments, some simple measures 
such as performance targets endure. For example, the Hay Group, a global management 
consulting firm, writes (Garret 2009): 
Performance measures can be difficult to construct, and as a consequence, 
schemes are often based on rolling annual targets...  
Thus, even in the face of complicated bonus payments, targets play a role. Targets may play an 
even more significant role if employees rely on their experience within an organization to inform 
their own expectations or rules-of-thumb with respect to performance expectations (Rousseau 
and Greller 1994).  
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 Another factor in studying incentives is the question of whether incentives actually affect 
behavior. Analysis of the banking industry finds evidence to support the assertion that a strong 
bonus culture is related to higher risk-taking (Efing et al. 2014). Literature examining risk taking 
across industries more broadly also shows a relationship between incentive structures and risky 
positions (Coles, Daniel and Naveen 2006; Low 2009; Agarwal, Daniel and Naik 2009).  
 Thus, it is observed that targets play a role in incentive schemes and that these incentives 
can affect how decisions are made. Further, the decisions that are affected by targets can have 
significant consequences such as in the 2008 financial crisis. These observations motivate the 
study of how targets affect decision making and the factors that affect how an optimal target 
should be set.  
The remainder of this chapter discusses relevant literature on incentives and targets. In 
particular, the many ways targets can be incorporated in management are introduced and the 
principal model relationship as a means to analyze incentives is discussed. The chapter concludes 
with a description of the research objectives.   
1.2.      Targets Take Many Forms  
The word “target” takes on different meanings in different areas of the literature. Some 
authors refer to opportunities to be pursued as targets (Gerding and Morrison 1980). In the 
finance literature, the word “target” is frequently used to refer to companies that an organization 
seeks to acquire (Davis and Stout 1992). In this work, the term “target” is used to mean a 
measure that delineates acceptable outcomes from unacceptable outcomes. Given this broad 
definition, it is not surprising that targets arise in practice in many forms. Some common 
applications of targets are described in the following paragraphs.   
Management by objectives (MBO): MBO is a management technique that involves a 
participative approach to setting goals for a given time frame and measuring employee 
performance by comparison with the stated goals. This approach was introduced by Drucker 
(1954) and has notably been applied in the management of HP (Packard 2006). MBO enjoyed 
widespread popularity from the 1950s to the 1990s with over 80% of Fortune 500 firms 
reportedly using MBO as standard operating procedure by 1992 (Odiorne 1992). MBO is not 
without its detractors. Deming (1982) among others have criticized the approach (Jamieson 
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1973, Kondrasuk 1981). MBO has since fallen out of favor. Researchers note, however, that the 
core concept of target and goal setting survives under various headings in management (Gibson 
and Tesone 2001). 
Objectives and key results (OKR): OKR is an approach to goal setting in an organization 
introduced by Grove (1995). In this approach, the goals, or OKRs, are intended to be distinct 
from performance reviews. OKRs are intended to focus efforts on tasks with measurable 
outcomes that are important to the organization (Klau 2013). OKRs are notably used by Google, 
Intel, and LinkedIn (First Round Capital 2014).  
Market benchmarks: Market benchmarks create performance standards commonly used 
in the financial services industry. Mutual fund performance, for example, is often measured by 
the fund’s returns in relation to other similarly constructed portfolios or to broad market 
benchmarks such as the S&P 500 (Grinblatt and Titman 1989). Hedge funds also commonly 
incorporate benchmarks into the compensation contracts of the hedge fund managers. High-water 
mark contracts, for example, create a mechanism in which the fund manager receives incentive 
pay as a proportion of returns above a specified level (Panageas and Westerfield 2009, Drechsler 
2014).  
Downside risk measures: Downside risk measures relate to the probability that an 
investment fails to meet some minimum acceptable return (MAR) (Sortino and van der Meer 
1991). Multiple methods for measuring downside risk have been proposed. Baumol (1963) 
suggested a measure that considered both the magnitude and the probability of falling below the 
MAR. Fishburn (1977) proposed a probability weighted function of returns below a given target. 
Performance standards: Performance standards define measures of acceptable 
performance for an employee.  Employees are generally aware of the standards by which their 
performance will be judged, and such standards create targets for the employees. These standards 
can be set or measured in numerous ways.  For example, a performance may be measured as 
actual net income versus projected net income, earnings this year versus earnings last year, cash 
flow versus the cost of capital, or performance relative to a peer group (Murphy 2000).  
Gainsharing: Gainsharing refers to the broad class of incentives in which a group of 
employees is rewarded if the performance of the group exceeds a performance standard. The 
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standards are often set by historical performance (Graham-Moore and Ross 1983), but the 
specific details of gainsharing mechanisms often vary by company (Markham et al. 1992, 
Welbourne and Gomez-Mejia 1995).  
1.3.      The Principal-Agent Problem Formulation 
The question of how targets affect the decision-making of an employee is related to the 
broad set of problems related to the principal-agent relationship. This relationship arises anytime 
one entity (the principal) delegates some task to another entity (the agent). In the case of target-
based incentives, the incentive is specifically formulated as a target.  The principal-agent 
formulation, on the other hand, is concerned with incentives more broadly.  
The principal-agent literature has its origins in the work of Barnard (1938) on contracts, 
the work of Arrow (1963) in defining moral hazard, and the work of Wilson (1968), and Ross 
(1973) in the definition of the issue as an agency problem. The model is primarily concerned 
with designing the optimal contract, i.e. incentive mechanism, given particular functional forms 
for the relevant payoff functions.   
To illustrate this contracting problem, consider the general formulation as formulated by 
Ross (1973). The agent is assumed to select some action, ,a A  which determines the random 
payoff to the principal, ( ,w a    where   is a random, future state of the world. The principal 
and agent agree to a fee schedule, 
   , ; .f f w a    (1.1) 
The risk neutral agent’s objective becomes the maximization of the expected fee schedule,  
    max , ;
a
E G f w a

     (1.2) 
where ( )G  is the agent’s belief of the probability distribution over  .  A utility function may be 
used instead of taking the expectation over the fees directly.  
The principal’s objective is the maximization of expected utility,  
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        max , , ;
f
E U w a f f w a f

   
 
 (1.3) 
where  a f  is a mapping of the fee to the agent’s action, and  U  is the principal’s utility 
function over money.  This problem is often solved as the optimization of a linear combination 
of the utilities of the principal and the agent.  The functions used to represent the different 
aspects of the principal-agent relationship change based on the type of assumptions made.  
 The set of actions available to the agent have been interpreted differently be different 
researchers. The most common interpretations are of the agent’s actions are the effort or work 
level exerted by the agent (Mirrlees 1976) or the ability level of the agent (Spence 1973). The set 
of all information relevant to the agent is encompassed by reference to the agent’s “type;” this 
information can modeled as the ability, utility function, and/or probability beliefs held by the 
agent (Laffont and Martimort 2002).  
Several variations on the classic principal-agent model exist to add layers of complexity 
that describe various managerial situations. The most common variations are introduced.  
 Adverse selection: Adverse selection occurs when the agent has private information 
about his type that is unavailable to the principal. This situation occurs, for example, in cases of 
bargaining (Myerson 1979) and in the regulation or governance of a firm (Baron and Myerson 
1982, Guesnerie and Laffont 1984).  The problem of adverse selection also motivates the study 
of indicators that update the state of information about the agent (e.g. Spence 1973, Ross 1977).  
 Moral hazard: Moral hazard occurs when the principal cannot directly observe the agent’s 
actions but must rely on other observable information to form beliefs about the actions taken. 
Insights are derived via an optimization problem over a set of convex preference functions, and 
the second-best solution (moral hazard) is often compared to the first-best solution (perfect 
information) to gauge the value of the missing information (Holmstrom 1979, Mirrlees 1999, 
Grossman and Hart 1983, Shavell 1979).  
Informed principal: An informed principal exists when the principal has information that 
is unavailable to the agent (Maskin and Tirole 1990, 1992; Aghion and Bolton 1987). Examples 
of this information asymmetry include defense contracting when only the buyer knows the 
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strategic importance of a military system or companies that have private information when 
seeking some form of insurance.  
 Information revelation: Given the importance of information in many variations of the 
principal agent problem, several researchers have examined mechanisms that induce truthful 
information revelation (Gibbard 1973, Green and Laffont 1977, Dasgupta, Hammond and 
Maskin 1979, Myerson 1981). 
Multitasking: Multitasking occurs when the agent is assigned a set of several tasks to 
complete. To analyze this scenario, researchers consider the agent’s utility over total effort and 
then relate measures of effort applied to each task to the relevant preference functions 
(Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991).  
 Repeat contracts: The classic principal-agent problem involves a one-shot contract. 
However, it is also possible to examine the case in which the principal may offer the same agent 
repeat contracts, thereby giving the principal the opportunity to learn about the agent on the basis 
of early contracts to inform the design of future offers (Lambert 1983, Rogerson 1985, Abreu et 
al. 1990). 
 In addition, several researchers have studied mixed models that incorporate multiple 
variations on the principal-agent contracting problem (e.g. Picard 1987, Prescott and Townsend 
1984).   
1.4.      Incentives for Effort Versus Incentives for Decisions  
In principal-agent models, the action taken by the agent is usually interpreted as effort 
towards a particular task. Risk enters the problem when the incentive or fee schedule (e.g. 
Equation 1.1) contains a random variable. For a fixed effort level, the payoff is uncertain when it 
depends on a random variable. This risk disappears when the pay is based on a fixed salary. The 
risk preference of the agent becomes important for modeling what level of risk the agent will 
accept in a contract. 
In addition to effort, incentives may be used to guide decision making as illustrated in 
Figure 1.1.  In another interpretation of the principal-agent model, the actions taken by the agent 
represent decisions the agent makes on the principal’s behalf, i.e. the “Decisions” arc in Figure  
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Figure 1.1. The conceptual framework for studying the effect of incentives on outcomes 
 
1.1. In this case, the risk preferences of the agent become important because they dictate the 
types of risks or uncertainties that will determine the outcomes and thus the profit of the 
principal.   
Before continuing with this discussion, a distinction is required here about the definition 
of risk attitude and risk taking. The normative decision literature uses the Pratt (1964) and Arrow 
(1965) definition of risk aversion while the principal-agent literature entertains a variety of 
measures of risk and risk taking (March and Shapira 1987). Because both literatures contain 
relevant developments, this discussion uses the term risk broadly. 
When the risk attitude of the agent is different from the risk attitude in the principal, the 
possibility exists for the agent to make selections that are suboptimal to the principal. Generally, 
the agent is perceived to be more risk averse than the principal (Coffee 1988).  An explanation 
for this observation is that the shareholders of a firm simultaneously invest in many firms, 
diversifying their holdings while a manager within a firm has over-investment in a single firm 
due to the value of the job itself (Amihud and Lev 1981, Holmstrom and Milgrom 1987).  
 Assuming the agent is more risk averse than the principal, a question arises about how to 
encourage greater risk-taking in the agent’s decision making. One approach is to design 
monitoring mechanisms in which the board of a firm (representing the principal) controls the 
actions of the agent by direct monitoring (Beatty and Zajac 1994). Because monitoring is costly, 
Principal 
(Organization) 
Agent 
(Manager) 
Environment 
Outcome 
Contract 
(Incentives) 
Effort 
Decisions 
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however, there is interest in designing a contract that supports the appropriate level of risk taking 
through the incentives present.  
The literature in this area considers the portion of pay that is fixed (i.e. a salary) and the 
portion of pay that is contingent on meeting performance standards.  Different proportions of 
variable pay are predicted to affect the level of risk-taking (Harris and Raviv 1979). If all pay 
received by the agent is fixed, then the agent tends to prefer less risky alternatives (Bulmash and 
Maherz 1985, Hill et al. 1988, Hill and Snell 1989). This result is expected because the agent 
does not benefit from the uncertain outcome but bears risks in the form of job security if the 
outcome is very poor. The other side of this prediction is that a larger portion of variable pay will 
increase agent risk-taking because the agent shares in higher gains that are obtained (Larcker 
1983, Mehran 1995). These predictions are tempered by several factors, however.  The 
overinvestment of the manager in the firm may lead to risk averse behavior (Amihud and Lev 
1981, Coffee 1988). Risk averse behavior may be exaggerated if the manager perceives “critical 
performance targets” that affect job security (March and Shapira 1987) or if firm performance 
affects job security (Walsh and Seward 1990).  
The contingent pay is generally based on achieving some performance target. Following 
the previous presentation of the numerous ways targets appear in management, it is not 
surprising that firms design the contingent portion of agent pay in a variety of ways (Gomez-
Mejia and Balkin 1992). However, the way in which these targets are set remains largely 
unexplored. As stated by Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia (1998): 
The question of target attainability ultimately concerns the effect of high or low 
targets on risk-taking behavior. Agency-based corporate governance models are 
relatively silent on this issue, even though it appears to be a crucial element in 
governance design.  
This question is precisely the focus of the research presented in future chapters. The 
analysis of target based decision making in the literature can be classified as being descriptive or 
normative.  
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1.5.      Targets as Reference Points in Prospect Theory 
Descriptive treatments of target based decision making are based on prospect theory, one 
of the best known models of descriptive decision making behavior (Kahneman and Tversky 
1979).  Prospect theory asserts that decision makers set reference points or targets that affect how 
they make decisions. Behavior is risk-averse above the target and risk-seeking below it, resulting 
in an S-shaped utility curve as shown in Figure 1.2. The predictions of prospect theory are based 
on experimental observations of decision making (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, Tversky and 
Kahneman 1991, Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988). 
The risk taking behavior of managers has been examined within the context of prospect 
theory. Empirical studies provide evidence that managerial risk taking follows predictions of 
prospect theory. Using average industry performance as the reference point, risk-return 
associations indicate risk seeking behavior below the target and risk averse behavior above it 
(Fiegenbaum and Thomas 1988, Jegers 1991). Similar results are obtained with assumptions of 
individualized reference points (Lehner 2000). Risk seeking decisions are also observed for 
below target outcomes in experimental settings with managers as the subjects (Fiegenbaum and 
Thomas 1988).  
Behavioral predictions based on prospect theory have been used to explain risk taking 
behavior of managers and has also been used within the conceptual framework of the principal 
agent model to postulate how reference points may affect agent decision making (Wiseman and 
Gomez-Mejia 1998). 
 
 
Figure 1.2  An S-shaped utility curve that is risk averse above/risk seeking below the target.  
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1.6.      Targets and Normative Decision Making 
Normative decision making describes how decisions ought to be made if the decision 
maker is to be consistent with axioms of rational thought. A normative or rational decision is one 
that follows the axioms of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). These axioms form the basis 
of utility theory. The decision maker who is assumed to be rational and logically consistent seeks 
to make decisions that maximize expected utility. For a single-attribute utility function, ( ),U x  
with a probability density over the outcome given by ( ),f x  the expected utility is calculated as 
       .E U x f x U x dx     (1.4) 
The normative agent seeks to maximize self-interest according to the given incentive 
structure. This self-interest takes the form of an effective utility function that is implied by the 
incentive (Abbas et al. 2009a). Abbas et al. (2009a) derive effective utility functions for both 
fixed targets and tournament-based targets.  For probabilistically independent targets, a multi-
linear utility function describes the decision maker’s behavior (Bordley and Kirkwood, 2004). 
When the target is stochastic in nature, effective utility function becomes defined by the 
probability distribution of the target (Castagnoli and LiCalzi 1996, Bordley and LiCalzi 2000).  
The utility function implied by a target-based incentive is a step function that is 0 below 
the target and is 1 above the target (Abbas et al. 2009a). With this effective utility function, the 
expected utility for the manager is the probability that the outcome will exceed the target for a 
given alternative. The expected utility for the manager can therefore be controlled by how the 
target is set.   
When the decision alternatives are known in advance of setting the target, it is possible to 
perfectly align the decisions of the manager and the preferences of the organization by setting the 
target at the aspiration equivalent (Abbas and Matheson 2005). This result may also be extended 
to the case of multiattribute targets (Abbas and Matheson 2009).  However, when the decision 
alternatives are unknown at the time the target is set, it is unclear how to set an optimal target. 
This question is at the heart of the current work. The relationship between this work and the 
literature on targets and normative decision making is illustrated in Figure 1.3.  
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Figure 1.3. Flow chart showing the relationship of this work to the decision analysis literature;      
1. Castagnoli and LiCalzi (1996), Bordley and LiCalzi (2000), 2. Abbas and Matheson (2005, 2009) 
 
It is also possible to frame targets and utility in terms of loss functions. Borch (1968) 
defines a loss function in terms of a normalized utility function and showed that choosing a 
lottery that minimizes the probability of ruin is equivalent to choosing the lottery with the 
greatest expected utility. The concept of a loss function is related to downside risk measures in 
that the emphasis is on the potential negative consequences. Not all work in this area, however, 
relates the results to utility theory. 
1.7.      Overview of Research Objectives 
This research examines the effect of target-based incentives within a principal-agent type 
relationship. The model considered is unique from the principal-agent literature, however, in that 
the effect of target-based incentives on agent decision making are examined exclusively. 
Although the model relies on a normative framework, it is also unique from the normative 
literature because it considers the case of fixed targets in which the decision alternatives are 
unknown.  
This research focuses specifically on fixed targets. Fixed targets are differentiated from 
uncertain targets in that they are a deterministic value, not a random variable. The emphasis on 
fixed targets is motivated by the presence of fixed targets in management settings and also by 
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implications of limited rationality. Limited rationality, also referred to as bounded rationality, is 
the idea that people are limited in their decision making by cognitive ability, information, and 
time (Simon 1955). The normative decision maker is generally modeled as having infinite 
computational resources to identify the alternative with the greatest expected utility. With 
infinite computational resources, the normative decision maker treats any uncertain target as a 
random variable. In practice, however, decision makers lack infinite computational resources. 
When faced with an uncertain target, it is reasonable to assume the decision maker may simplify 
the decision task by assigning a best estimate to the random variable and act to maximize the 
probability of meeting this fixed target. Thus, when limited rationality is considered, fixed 
targets are an appropriate study even in the presence of an uncertain target.  
The overall motivation for the work is to address the gap that exists with respect to how 
large or how small a target should be set. The literature on setting targets in business has 
admonished that (Copeland et al., 2000): 
There is no one deductive method that will tell management ‘how 
much is enough’ [for a target]. 
This research strives to answer questions about how to set targets when the decision alternatives 
are not known in advance. Two types of analysis are used in pursuit of answers to this problem, a 
modeling and simulation based inquiry as well as an experimental based inquiry.   
 Modeling and simulation is used to derive theoretical insights into how targets can be set 
optimally. The objectives of this portion of the research are  
(1) to understand how target based decision making affects organizational value, and 
(2) to characterize how various factors influence the setting of an optimal target. 
The second goal is quite broad. It includes factors that are internal to the organization, such as 
the organization’s risk aversion and organizational structure as well as factors external to the 
organization such as the distribution of decision alternatives.  
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 Behavioral experiments are conducted to provide empirical data on how limitations to 
assumptions of perfectly normative behavior affect the setting of an optimal target. The 
objectives of this portion of the research are 
(1) to compare decision making under different types of incentive structures, and 
(2) to characterize how well individuals follow normative predictions as a function of 
properties of the available decision alternatives. 
The results of this research will provide a better understanding of the effects of targets on 
an organization and will enable an organization to identify situations when targets are beneficial 
and when they are not. When targets are used, the results will provide strategies for how to set 
the targets optimally. Through this knowledge, it may be possible for organizations to achieve a 
measurable increase in value by implementing changes to how targets are used in the 
organization.  
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2.   THE VALUE GAP MODEL:  
SIMULATION AND VISUALIZATION 
 
2.1.   Introduction 
The effect of target-based decision making in a principal agent relationship is analyzed 
by developing a simulation model. Although this work considers a scenario in which the agent 
makes decisions on behalf of the principal, its formulation differs from classic treatments of the 
principal agent problem (for a review, see Eisenhardt 1989). The model developed is designed to 
specifically examine the effects of target-based decision making in order to provide insight into 
how targets should be set. 
Three key differences distinguish this model and classic principal agent problems. (1) 
The effect of decision making is examined in isolation of a utility function over effort or other 
attributes important to the agent. (2) The contract or incentive offered by the principal is limited 
to a target-based formulation. (3) The set of actions or decision alternatives available to the agent 
are unknown at the time of specifying the incentive. These characteristics of the model enable it 
to analyze the effect of target setting specifically. Generalizations of the model that relax these 
differences are also possible. Additionally, although the basic formulation assumes perfect 
information symmetry, this assumption can be relaxed without affecting the fundamental 
formulation.  
The effect of a given target is measured in terms of value to the organization. When the 
manager makes a decision that is consistent with the organization’s preferences, no value is lost. 
However, if the manager selects an alternative that is less preferred by the organization to 
another alternative, then the difference in value between those alternatives defines the value lost 
in that decision. This work defines this lost value as the value gap.  Because there is uncertainty 
about the decision alternatives that will be faced by the manager, the value gap is a random 
variable that depends on the distribution of decision alternatives, the incentive or target, and the 
organization’s preference. A Monte Carlo simulation is used to calculate the value gap.  
Simulation models are particularly useful for gaining insight to the interaction and 
importance of variables in a system (Pegden, Shannon, and Sadowski 1995). The value gap 
15 
 
model described in this chapter provides a flexible tool for analyzing the effect of target-based 
decision. For a set of system parameters, the optimal target can be identified as the target that 
minimizes the expected value gap. System parameters include the characteristics of the 
organization and the environment in which it operates.  
The characteristics of the organization are formulated as though the organization were 
represented by a single normative decision maker. This assumption follows the premise of 
unitary actor or rational actor models (Allison 1971) in which organizations are modeled to 
behave like individuals. Although there is criticism for the simplification inherent in this choice 
of modeling (Shoemaker 1993), it is an appropriate choice for the problem of analyzing target-
based decisions. The assumption is consistent with the representation of the principal’s interests 
in the economics literature (Eisenhardt 1989, Laffont and Martimort 2002). It is also consistent 
with explorations of how characteristics of a firm’s board of directors and governance structure 
relates to the risk attitude implied by strategic positions held by the firm (Baysinger et al. 1991, 
Deutsch et al. 2011).  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 presents the problem 
formulation. Section 2.3 explains how the relevant uncertainties are represented. Section 2.4 
outlines the simulation method. Section 2.5 describes a visual representation of the model while 
Section 2.6 presents analytic results for a simple case. Finally, Section 2.7 explains how 
extensions to the model can expand its applicability.    
2.2.   Problem Formulation 
This research considers the case of a principal-agent type relationship in which a manager 
makes a decision on behalf of an organization. The manager faces a target-based incentive in 
which a reward is paid if the outcome of a decision exceeds a specified target. The target is 
assumed deterministic and known by the manager when making a decision. The alternatives 
available to the manager involve uncertain outcomes and are unknown when the target is set. The 
probability distribution of each alternative is assumed to be known by the manager. Additionally, 
the organization is assumed to agree with the manager on the distribution of each alternative.  
This formulation differs from classic treatments of the principal-agent problem. To 
emphasize that this is not a classic treatment of the problem, some terminology is changed. The 
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term “organization” is used in place of “principal,” i.e. the entity that delegates a decision 
making task. The term “manager” is used in place of “agent,” i.e. the entity that acts on behalf of 
another. This terminology emphasizes the context in which questions of target-setting arise.  
2.2.1 The Manager’s Selection 
The manager is rewarded for meeting the target and therefore selects the project with the 
greatest probability of meeting or exceeding the target (Borch 1968, Abbas et al. 2009a).  The 
manager’s current portfolio of uncertain deals is not considered. It is also assumed that the 
manager will select one of the project alternatives, i.e. “do nothing” is not an option. 
The notation is as follows. The fixed target is denoted T.  Let A  be a vector of the set of 
n  decision alternatives available to the manager. The cumulative distribution over profit for each 
alternative i  is given by  iF T .  The manager’s selection is denoted ,Ma  is therefore 
 arg max 1 ( ) .M ia F T                                                    (2.1) 
2.2.2 The Organization’s Preference 
The organization is assumed to follow utility theory. Let the organizations utility function 
be denoted  U x , and the probability density over profit for alternative i be denoted  .if x   The 
organization prefers the alternative with the greatest expected utility, and it values this alternative 
according to its certain equivalent. Let the certain equivalent of alternative i  be denoted
i
a .  The 
organization’s selection, denoted ,Oa  is therefore  
  1arg max ( ) ( ) .O ia U f x U x dx                                         (2.2) 
Note that (2.2) calculates the organization’s preference on the basis of the alternative with the 
greatest certain equivalent. This alternative is guaranteed to also have the greatest expected 
utility.  
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2.2.3 Defining the Value Gap 
A loss in value occurs when the manager selects a project that is not the one most 
preferred by the organization, that is value will be lost if 
.
O M
a a                                                                  (2.3) 
The value gap is defined as a measure of the amount of value that is lost due to manager 
decisions that are inconsistent with the organization’s preference.  The value gap is denoted VG  
and is defined as the difference in certain equivalents between the project that would have been 
most preferred by the organization and the project that is selected by the manager, 
.
O M
VG a a                                                             (2.4) 
The value gap is a random variable that is a function of the target and the decision 
alternatives available to the manager in a given situation.  Because the value gap for any one 
decision is not representative of the distribution, an expected value of the value gap is calculated 
over a number of simulated decisions. The model enables the complete characterization of the 
distribution of the value gap; however, descriptive statistics of these distributions are used to 
analyze the effect of a given target.   
2.3.   Representing Uncertain Decision Alternatives  
A key element of the simulation model is the representation of the decision alternatives 
available to the manager. Each decision alternative has an uncertain outcome. Thus, each 
alternative is itself represented by a probability distribution.  Parametric probability distributions 
are used to represent the decision alternatives. These distributions are fully characterized by a 
finite number of parameters.  By assigning a probability distribution over these defining 
parameters, it is possible to create a distribution of alternatives with uncertain outcomes. 
The procedure for representing uncertain decision alternatives first requires the 
specification of the particular parametric model that describes the uncertainty associated with 
each decision alternative. For example, one might specify that each decision alternative has an 
uncertain outcome that follows a Gaussian distribution. In that case, each decision alternative is 
fully characterized by its mean and variance.  It may be possible that the potential decision 
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alternatives do not all follow the same parametric model. If this is the case, then it is necessary to 
specify what proportion of decision situations follows each particular model.  
The second step is to specify a distribution over the parameters for each model. This step 
could be accomplished using expert opinions, historical data, or other quantitative methods. For 
example, consider the mean and variance of quarterly returns calculated for a set of open-ended 
U.S. mutual funds as shown in Figure 2.1. If the distributions are assumed to be approximately 
Gaussian, then the distribution of model parameters may be matched to the observed data. Note 
that the assumption of normality in mutual fund returns is used in the literature (Markowitz 1952, 
1959) although stock returns are often not symmetric (Rozelle and Fielitz 1980, Simkowitz and 
Beedles 1980).  The example presented is for the case of outcomes that follow a Gaussian 
distribution. The particular parametric model or models that are specified may affect how the 
distribution of the model parameters is estimated.  
 
 
Figure 2.1  Mean and variance of quarterly returns of 12,931 open-ended U.S. mutual funds 
from 2005 to 2014. Data from Morningstar Direct. 
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2.4.   Simulation Method 
The simulation method used to calculate the expected value gap and the variance of the 
value gap as a function of the fixed target is described by the following steps.  
1. Set the fixed target level.  
2. Generate a set of decision alternatives by simulating sets of parameters associated 
with the parametric model of uncertainty for the alternatives. 
3. Calculate the organization’s best decision alternative as the alternative that maximizes 
the certain equivalent for the organization given by (2.2). 
4. Calculate the manager’s best decision alternative as the alternative that maximizes the 
manager’s probability of attaining the target, i.e. (2.1). 
5. Calculate the value gap according to (2.4). 
6. Repeat for N simulated decisions, and calculate the expectation and variance of the 
value gap. 
7. Repeat for different values of the fixed target. 
 
 These steps assume several system variables have been specified. Section 2.3 described 
the representation of the uncertain decision alternatives. In addition, the organization’s utility 
function must be identified, and the number of decision alternatives available to the manager at 
each decision must be specified.   
 This simulation method enables the analysis of various parameters and how the value gap 
is influenced in each case. It is helpful to develop a simple base case that provides a benchmark 
by which the effect of various parameters can be examined independently of each other and will 
therefore be revisited in later chapters.  The simple base case has the following conditions. 
 The organization is risk neutral.  
 The manager selects between two decision alternatives.  
 Each decision alternative has a Gaussian distribution.  
 The Gaussian parameters of the alternatives  2,i i   are independent and uniformly 
distributed from 0 to 1.  
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Figure 2.2   The simulation results for the simple base case.  
 
The results of this simple case are shown in Figure 2.2.  
Due to the scaling of the Gaussian parameters from 0 to 1, the magnitudes of [ ]E VG  and 
( )V VG  are also scaled. For example, suppose an organization has a uniform distribution over the 
potential alternatives’ means and variances that range from $0 to $50 million dollars. Then an 
expected value gap of 0.05 would, in units of dollars, be $2.5 million.  
The results show that for these parameters, a minimum expected value gap exists as 
illustrated in Figure 2.2.  The optimal target is the midpoint of the distribution over the decision 
alternatives’ means. The variance of the value gap also has a minimum that coincides with the 
minimum of the expected value gap. The next sections consider deviations from the base case.  
2.5.   Visual Representation of the Model 
A nice feature of the simulation method described in this chapter is that it enables a visual 
representation of the analysis for certain probability distributions. The visual representation of 
the model works particularly well when each decision alternative has a Gaussian distribution 
over possible outcomes. The visual representation of the model is therefore presented for this 
case.   
The visualization of the value gap model requires the calculation of indifference curves 
for both the manager and the organization. First, consider the manager who seeks to maximize 
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the probability of attaining the target. The conversion of a normal distribution to a standard 
normal distribution provides the means to derive the set of points that have the same probability 
of attaining the target. For any given 
i
  and 2 ,
i
  the iso-probability curve is found by solving 
the equation 
2 2
i
i
T T 
 
 
                                                              (2.5) 
for the desired variable, either
i
  or 2.
i
  Thus, the iso-probability contour in terms of   that is 
also the iso-preference contour for the manager is given by 
 
 22
2
.
i
M
i
T
T
 
 


                                                  (2.6) 
Curves of equal preference to the manager are plotted using (2.6). Figure 2.3 shows iso-
preference curves for 0.5T   plotted on the mean-variance domain.  The symmetry of the figure 
is due to the nature of the Gaussian distribution.  Plotting a set of project alternatives on this 
figure shows which project will be selected by the division. It is the project that lies the farthest 
toward the lower right corner.  In Figure 2.4, the circled project has a probability greater than 0.6 
of meeting the target. This probability is the greatest among the set of alternatives, making this 
project the most preferred alternative by the manager. 
Next, consider the iso-preference contour of the organization. This curve depends on the 
utility function. Assume the organization operates with a constant risk tolerance  ; its utility 
curve can then be represented by an exponential utility function (Howard and Abbas 2015).  
With an exponential utility curve and outcomes that follow a Gaussian distribution, the certain 
equivalent for alternative i  is given by  
2
.
2
i
i i
a



                                                          (2.7) 
The set of points that have certain equivalents equal to that of 
i
a  is given by 
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 
2
2 ,
2
O i
a

 

                                                     (2.6) 
and this equation gives the iso-preference contour for the organization.  Figure 2.5 illustrates the 
lines of constant certain equivalent for a set of project alternatives. The project alternative that is 
most preferred by the company may be found graphically; it lies on the rightmost line of constant 
certain equivalent. The project with the greatest certain equivalent is circled in Figure 2.5.  
 
 
Figure 2.3  The curves of constant probability of meeting the target, T = 0.5. 
 
Figure 2.4   Selection of an alternative by the manager. 
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Value gaps arise due to the difference in preferences between the manager and the 
organization. The impact that these different preferences have on the likelihood of a value gap 
can be visualized by plotting the preference curves of the manager and the organization on the 
same graph. Consider, for example, the curves shown in Figure 2.6. The organization and the 
manager disagree about which alternative is most preferred, but they agree that the four 
alternatives to the left of both curves are not preferred.  
 
Figure 2.5   The certain equivalents for each project alternative,     
 
Figure 2.6   The difference in selection by the organization and the manager. 
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The iso-preference contours divide the mean-variance domain into regions where the 
organization and manager agree about the relative desirability of an alternative and areas where 
they disagree. These preference regions are defined in relative to a reference point.  Figure 2.7 
labels the regions I-IV, and the significance of each is explained below.  
I. Projects in this region are less preferred to ia  by both the organization and the 
division. 
II. Projects in this region are more preferred to ia  by the organization but are less 
preferred by the division. 
III. Projects in this region are less preferred to ia  by the organization but are more 
preferred by the division.   
IV. Projects in this region are more preferred to ia  by both the organization and the 
division.  
The preference regions determine the nature of potential value gaps. They outline the 
regions where the fixed target incentive causes a deviation in preference from the organization’s 
utility function. Examining how various factors affect these regions provides insight into the 
reasons behind certain simulation results, as will be discussed in later chapters.  
 
 
Figure 2.7  Difference in preferences in relation to a reference point. 
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2.6.   Analytic Results for a Simple Case 
The visualization of the simulation model enables analytic results for the simple base 
case described in Section 2.4.  Because the mean and variance parameters are uniformly 
distributed across the domain, the area of the preference regions associated with disagreement (II 
and III) is proportional to the probability of a value gap. The expected value gap is calculated 
directly.  
The expectation of a continuous random variable is found by integrating over the product 
of the value of the random variable with its respective probability. Calculate the expectation by 
conditioning on a given reference point with mean 
1
  and variance 2
1
.  Then, the conditional 
expected value gap when a second alternative is introduced is  
  22 2 21 1 2 2 1 2 2 2,| , ,E VG f a a d d                                     (2.7) 
where the bounds of integration are defined by the preference regions where the organization and 
the manager differ on the desirability of alternatives, i.e. regions II and III.  
 The risk neutral organization values each alternative at its mean.  Equation (2.7) then 
becomes 
  22 2 21 1 2 2 1 2 2 2,| , .E VG f d d                                     (2.8) 
Figure 2.8 illustrates how the calculation of (2.8) proceeds with the bounds of integration 
represented by the darker blue regions. The bounds depend on whether the reference point is 
greater or less than the target. The expectation then becomes 
  
  
2
2
2 2
1 2 2 1 2 2 2,2
1 1 2 2
1 2 2 1 2 2 2,
( ) ,
| , .
( ) ,
P T f d d
E VG
P T f d d
 
 
      
 
      
  
   
  
 
 
             (2.9) 
 The unconditional expected value gap is obtained by integrating over the possible values 
that the reference point can take to obtain  
  2 21 1 1 1| , .E VG E VG d d                                      (2.10) 
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Calculating the expected value gap yields, 
 
   
   
4 4
min max
23 2 3 3
T TV
E VG
 
 
   
   
      
                                   (2.11) 
where V is a constant that is determined by the bounds of the distribution over 2.  It is 
calculated as 
  
2 2 2 4 4 2
3 3max min max min max
max min max min2
min
( ) ( ) 4
ln .
2 4 3
V
    
   

 
                  (2.12) 
The calculations to obtain (2.11) and (2.12) are included in Appendix A.  
The expected value gap as a function of the fixed target can now be plotted as illustrated 
in Figure 2.8.  Observation shows that the optimal target lies at the mean of the distribution for 
project alternative means. For the conditions of the simple base case, this result can be proven 
using the second derivative test, leading to the following theorem. The proof is provided in 
Appendix A. 
THEOREM 1: 
Assume that a risk neutral company rewards a division for reaching a fixed target and that the 
division selects from a set of two projects with uncertain payoffs. The payoffs are normally 
distributed with mean   and variance 
2.  The project means and variances are independent 
and identically distributed with uniform distributions on the domains 
min max
[ ,    and 
2 2
min max
[ , .    
The fixed target that minimizes the expected value gap is given by  
max min*
2
T
 
                                        (2.13) 
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Figure 2.8 The expected value gap for the risk neutral organization,  ~ 0,1 ,U  2 ~ 0,1 .U  
 
Although analytic results are presented for this simple case, it is important to note that 
even minor changes in the assumptions quickly cause the calculations to become intractable. To 
illustrate this, consider what happens if more than two alternatives are available to the manager.  
An increase in the number of decision alternatives increases the number of ways the 
manager and the organization can potentially disagree about the relative attractiveness of each 
alternative as illustrated in Figure 2.9. Consider a set of alternatives that is generated one at a 
time, and the first alternative is the reference point.  If there is only one alternative, there is no 
disagreement. With two alternatives, the entities either agree as outlined by the preference 
regions in Figure 2.7.  The case of three alternatives is more complicated because there are more 
ways preference orderings can differ. To see this, the possible preference orders conditioned on 
the location of the second alternative. If the second alternative is in preference region I, the first 
alternative remains the reference point. If the second alternative is in region IV, it becomes the 
reference point, and the analysis of the third alternative must only consider the third alternative 
and the reference point. However, if the second alternative is in preference region II or III 
(columns 2 and 3 of Figure 2.9), then additional preference regions must be defined to 
characterize all the possible preference combinations of the manager and organization. This is 
due to different preference orderings.  Both project 1 and project 2 become reference points.  
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Figure 2.9 The inclusion of a third alternative necessitates defining additional preference regions. 
 
The need for a simulation based approach to this problem is illustrated by the preceding 
example.  Closed-form, analytic results become impossible as complexity is added to the 
analysis.  This additional complexity is required in order to model situations that mirror real life. 
Note that other approximations could be used to calculate the expected value gap. For example, 
the set of alternatives could be discretized, and an algorithm could be written to calculate the 
value gap for every possible combination of alternatives to find the expected value gap. When 
such an algorithm is implemented, however, it requires computational power that is orders of 
magnitude greater than the simulation based approach. Consider discretizing the [0, 1] mean-
variance domain into 100 sections for both the mean and variance. For each alternative, 10,000 
mean-variance combinations are possible. To approximate the expected value gap for two 
alternatives requires the consideration of 10,000
2
 combinations of potential alternatives whereas 
with only 10,000 simulated points, the simulation model converges to the value.  
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2.7.   Extensions of the Model 
The simulation-based approach presented in this chapter is a useful tool for analyzing 
target based decision making. The method may be tailored to derive insights for a variety of 
organizational settings and contexts. It is generalizable to both the distribution of decision 
alternatives and the utility function of the organization.  Further generalizations are also possible. 
For example, if the organization does not know the number of alternatives that will be available 
to the manager but can specify its belief about the probability of each number of alternatives, 
then the expected value gap may be calculated by conditioning on each possible number of 
alternatives. Asymmetric information can also be modeled by assuming properties about the 
types of information asymmetries and incorporating the different probability distributions in the 
simulation. This model may also be used as a component within a larger system.  
Future chapters analyze some of these extensions of the model in the setting of individual 
and cooperative targets.  
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3.   INDIVIDUAL TARGETS: 
CHARACTERIZING FACTORS THAT AFFECT OPTIMALITY 
 
3.1.   Introduction 
An optimal target is one that aligns the decision making of the manager as closely as 
possible with the preferences of the organization. The magnitude of the optimal target may be 
found by identifying the target that minimizes the expected value gap which is calculated using 
the methods described in Chapter 2. One of the benefits of this simulation based approach is its 
flexibility to quantify the effects of various assumptions on the optimal target as shown in this 
chapter. 
The case of a single decision-maker is considered when analyzing how various factors 
affect the optimal target. The organization sets a fixed target for a manager who makes a 
decision based on the available decision alternatives. This decision is made in isolation of 
possible decisions being made elsewhere in the organization. Thus, this case represents an 
individual target and enables the examination of how a given factor affects target optimality.  
This chapter characterizes the effects of the organization’s risk aversion, the number of 
decision alternatives available to the manager, and the distribution of those alternatives on the 
magnitude of the optimal fixed target. This chapter expands on results reported in the literature 
(Hupman and Abbas 2014), presenting additional analyses and examining the reasons that 
underpin the observed results.  These interpretations of the simulation results are largely based 
on the visualization of the simulation model.    
3.2.   Effects of Company Risk Aversion 
This section explores the effect of the company risk aversion on the expected value gap. 
Risk aversion, ,  is a measure of the magnitude of risk a decision maker is willing to accept. It is 
related to the shape of the utility function with its definition given by Arrow (1965) and Pratt 
(1964): 
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U x
x
U x
    (3.1) 
where ''( )U x  is the second derivative of the decision maker’s utility function and '( )U x  is its 
first derivative.  
The exponential utility function is appropriate when the decision maker exhibits constant 
risk aversion (Pratt 1964, Howard and Matheson 1972). Although constant risk aversion likely 
does not hold for values that range to infinity, in practice, the magnitude of outcomes are 
bounded below the infinite.  The decision maker may specify the range of outcomes for which 
constant risk aversion is appropriate, making the exponential utility function popular for many 
applications (e.g. Keeney 1977, Bouakiz and Sobel 1992, Schaettler and Sung 1993, Lim and 
Shanthikumar 2007, Corner and Corner 1995).  In this section, the case of constant risk aversion 
is examined. The effect of the magnitude of the risk aversion on the optimal target is 
characterized.  
The expected value gap is simulated for different organization risk aversions from 0 to 
2.5.  All other inputs to the simulation model remain at the same as the base case in order to 
analyze the effect of risk aversion in isolation of other effects. 10,000 decision situations are 
simulated, and the results are presented in Figure 3.1.    
 The main result is that the optimal target decreases with increases in risk aversion. This 
result makes intuitive sense. A risk-averse company would prefer its divisions to select projects 
with lower means but greater certainty that projects with higher means and greater uncertainty. 
A graphical examination of risk aversion yields further insight to these results. A decision 
maker with an exponential utility function who faces outcomes that have Gaussian distributions 
has a linear certain equivalent for each alternative that is given by 
 
2
.
2
a

   (3.2) 
For risk-averse companies, the certain equivalent depends on both its mean and its variance.  As 
risk aversion increases, the certain equivalent decreases for an uncertain alternative. The variance 
becomes less tolerable to the increasingly risk averse company. When plotting the iso-preference  
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Figure 3.1 Simulation results for the effect of risk aversion on the expected value gap. 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Risk aversion affects the company’s certain equivalent of a project. 
 
contour on a space defined by the project mean and variance, the slope of the iso-preference 
contour decreases with increasing risk aversion as shown in Figure 3.2. 
The effect of increasing risk aversion on the optimal target is illuminated by considering 
how the decrease in slope for the organization’s iso-preference curve affects the preference 
regions. Recall that the greater the space between the iso-preference curves of the organization 
and the manager, the greater the likelihood of a value gap existing.  
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Figure 3.3 illustrates how increasing risk aversion affects the value gap for low targets, 
i.e. those below the optimal 0.5 for this case. The regions where a value gap can occur (dark 
shading) initially decrease as the slope of the organization’s iso-preference contour approximates 
the average slope of the manager’s iso-preference contour. After the area of these regions 
reaches a minimum, however, they increase greatly with continued increases in the risk aversion.  
Figure 3.4 illustrates the case of high targets, i.e. targets above 0.5 for this case. The 
organization and manager’s iso-preference contours are most closely aligned at risk neutrality. 
As the risk aversion increases, the area of the preference regions where a value gap can occur 
(dark shading) increases. Based on the logic of Figure 3.4, one can expect that the expected value 
gap increases with increasing risk aversion for targets greater than the expected project mean.  
 
 
Figure 3.3 For low targets, the regions where a value gap can occur decrease in area and then 
increase in area with increasing company risk aversion. 
 
 
Figure 3.4 For high targets, increased risk aversion increases the likelihood of a value gap. 
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3.3.   Effects of the Number of Decision Alternatives 
The previous analysis uses the case where the manager must choose from two decision 
alternatives. It may be the case, however, that a manager can select from three or more 
alternatives. As the number of alternatives increases, it seems likely that the space between the 
alternatives on the mean-variance domain will decrease on average. As a result, the expected 
value gap is expected to decrease. This section quantifies the effect of the number of project 
alternatives on the value gap. 
The simulation is conducted with the same parameters as the base case with the exception 
of the number of alternatives considered. In addition, if more than one alternative has the same 
probability of attaining the target, and this is the best probability, the manager is assumed to 
select the alternative with the largest mean. The results are shown in Figure 3.5 show a few 
important insights. First, the optimal target increases toward the maximum project mean as the 
number of project alternatives increases. An intuitive explanation for this result is that as the 
number of alternatives is increased, the probability that one of the alternatives will have a high 
mean is greater. As the number of alternatives approaches infinity, the probability that one of the 
projects has a mean at the maximum approaches one. 
The simulation also shows that the expected value gap becomes more sensitive to the 
target as the number of alternatives increases. For targets less than the optimal value, the slope of  
 
 
Figure 3.5 The optimal target increases as the number of alternatives increases. 
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the expected value gap with respect to the target increases as the number of alternatives 
increases. The result is that the consequences for failing to set the target optimally are greater. 
To understand this trend, consider how the location of the most organization’s most 
preferred alternative in the mean-variance domain is affected as the number of uniformly 
distributed alternatives increases.  A greater number of alternatives increases the likelihood of a 
high mean, low variance alternative. This likelihood may be quantified by order statistics (Ross 
2003). Consider the probability distribution of the i
th
 largest independent and identically 
distributed random variable from a sample size of n,  
 
   
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 
 (3.3) 
This formula may be used to calculate the probability that the organization’s most 
preferred alternative occurs at a given location in the mean-variance domain. Let 
O
a  denote the 
organization’s most preferred alternative, and let 
O
  and 2
O
  denote the mean and variance of 
this alternative, respectively. The distribution of the mean and variance for the decision 
alternatives is given by 
2
2( , )f
 
 

.  The probability that a given alternative will be less 
preferred than 
O
a  is equal to the integration of 
2
2( , )f
 
 

 over the portion of the domain for 
which alternatives are less preferred to 
O
a , i.e. the area to the left of the iso-preference curve 
defined by preference regions I and III from Chapter 2. Thus, the probability that a given mean-
variance point is the location of the organization’s most preferred alternative is given by 
 2 2 2
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 
  
 
                  (3.4) 
Calculating (3.4) for a uniform distribution across the mean and variance and plotting the 
surface yields Figure 3.6. When only two decision alternatives are available, the distribution 
peaks at 2. When 10 alternatives are available, the distribution peaks at 10. These peaks show 
how the distribution is much more evenly spread across the domain when fewer alternatives are 
available. As the number of alternatives drawn from the distribution increases, it becomes 
increasingly likely that one of the alternatives has a high mean and low variance, stochastically 
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dominating the other alternatives and leading to agreement between the organization and the 
manager.  
These results have important implications for how organizations set targets. Consider a 
small company that operates in a niche market versus a large corporation operating across 
several markets. On average, the small company likely will have fewer decision alternatives 
available for a given decision than the larger company. As a result, the small company should set 
lower targets than the large corporation in order to minimize the expected value gap. 
 
 
  
 
Figure 3.6 A “high mean-low variance” alternative is more likely when more alternatives are 
available. 
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3.4.   Effects of an Efficient Frontier 
In practice, the decision alternatives faced by a division may follow any probability 
distribution. This section examines the effects of changing the underlying distribution of project 
alternatives by varying the distribution over the decision alternatives’ means and variances.   
The distributions analyzed exhibit different relationships between the mean and variance 
parameters. These relationships are analogous to the concept of efficient frontiers in the financial 
literature on portfolio selection (Markowitz 1952 and 1959, Sharpe 1964, Lintner 1965).  In a 
portfolio selection problem, a tradeoff exists between the mean and the variance of the portfolio; 
increases in the mean cannot be achieved without also increasing the variance. This tradeoff 
creates a boundary or efficient frontier of what alternatives are available.  
The finance literature generally plots the efficient frontier with the expected return on the 
vertical axis and the standard deviation on the horizontal axis. Throughout this work, however, 
the domain is plotted with the mean on the horizontal axis and the variance on the vertical axis. 
This conversion enables the certain equivalent of an uncertain deal for a decision maker with an 
exponential utility function to be plotted as a straight line. 
The relationship between mean and variance is represented by a copula structure. 
Copulas are a concept introduced by Sklar (1959) that join the marginal or individual 
distributions of n variables into a structure that accounts for different relationships among the 
variables. There are numerous forms of copulas and ways to construct them (Nelson 1999, 
Ruschendorf 2013). This analysis focuses on two copulas, the Gaussian and the Clayton copula.  
3.4.1 The Gaussian Copula 
The Gaussian copula is a symmetric copula. In the case of two variables, it is equivalent 
to the bivariate normal distribution.  It does not have upper or lower tail dependence (Embrechts 
et al. 2001).  
The Gaussian copula has been used extensively in the finance literature to model the 
correlation between various financial assets (Li 2000, Bluhme et al. 2003, Hamerle and Rosch 
2005). Because it lacks tail dependence, however, it underestimates the likelihood of extreme 
events (Malevergne and Sornette 2001, Zimmer 2012). This limitation led the Gaussian copula to 
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be dubbed “the formula that killed Wall Street” following the 2008 financial crisis (Salmon 
2009). Nevertheless, it remains an appropriate choice for evaluating how general dependence 
structures in the underlying distribution of alternatives affect the expected value gap.   
The amount of correlation between the two variables is governed by the parameter ρ 
which ranges from 0 to 1. Figure 3.7 illustrates the dispersion for three different levels of ρ.  
The expected value gap is calculated with decision alternatives generated according to 
Gaussian copulas with different correlation parameters. The results are presented in Figure 3.8 
for the cases with 2, 4, 10, and 20 decision alternatives. As the correlation between the 
alternatives’ mean and variance increases, the expected value gap for high targets decreases. 
When ρ equals 0.95, the expected value gap at high targets appears to approach zero. Figure 3.9 
shows a closer view of the behavior of the expected value gap. 
An optimal target exists even as the correlation parameter increases. For very high 
correlation parameters, this optimal target decreases slightly as shown in Figure 3.9. As the 
correlation increases, however, the consequence of setting a target greater than optimal decreases 
significantly. These results are important given the margin of error that may exist in estimating 
the distribution of potential future decision alternatives and other system parameters.  
 
 
Figure 3.7 Dispersion of samples from the symmetric Gaussian copula.  
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Figure 3.8 The expected value gap for different Gaussian copula parameters. 
 
 
Figure 3.9 A closer view of the behavior of the expected value gap. 
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Figure 3.10 The expected value gaps for the case of 10 decision alternatives shows a slight 
downward shift of the optimal target at high correlation parameters.  
 
These results suggest that if the decision alternatives are distributed along an efficient 
frontier, then high targets will result in very small expected value gaps. Consider for example, if 
the organization wished to limit the expected value gap to being no greater than 0.005. If the 
decision alternatives’ parameters follow a Gaussian copula with correlation of ρ = 0.95, then the 
target must be greater than 0.1 for two alternatives, greater than 0.24 for four alternatives, greater 
than 0.37 for ten alternatives, and greater than 0.44 for twenty alternatives as shown in Figure 
3.10.  
3.4.2 The Clayton Copula 
The Clayton copula is an asymmetric copula with lower tail dependence. It is a useful 
model of an efficient frontier because of its relationship to extreme value theory and in particular 
it relationship to the Pickands-Balkema-de Haan theorem (Balkema and de Haan 1974, Pickands 
1975). This theorem describes the generalized Pareto distribution of a random variable when the 
true distributions of the random variable are unknown. The Clayton copula has been shown to be 
the Archimedean copula that is analogous to the generalized Pareto distribution (Juri and 
Wuthrich 2002).  
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Figure 3.11 shows how the dispersion changes as a function of the governing correlation 
parameter θ.   An intuitive explanation for how the tail dependence observed in the Clayton 
copula relates to investment decisions is as follows. When making investments, the low 
variance-low mean deals are related to the prevailing interest rates the market that are set by 
major institutions such as the U.S. Federal Reserve. The dependence of these outcomes on the 
interest rates leads to higher correlation between the mean and variance in the lower tail. As the 
mean increases, the dispersion in the variance increases because the distributions are affected by 
a larger number of variables than interest rates. 
The expected value gap is calculated with decision alternative generated according to 
Clayton copulas with different correlation parameters. The results are presented in Figure 3.12 
for the cases with 2, 4, 10, and 20 decision alternatives.   
The expected value gap for targets above the optimal point flattens towards zero as the 
correlation increases. This trend that is notable because it is also observed for the Gaussian 
copula. The magnitude of the expected value gap for lower targets decreases with increasing 
correlation, a trend that is only observed for very high correlation parameters in the Gaussian 
copula.  
The results show that increasing the number of alternatives available decreases the 
optimal target for this case as well. Figure 3.13 shows a closer view of the how the optimal target 
decreases for the parameter θ equal to 5. 
 
 
Figure 3.11 The expected value gaps for the case of 10 decision alternatives as the distribution 
of alternatives approaches an efficient frontier with respect to the mean and variance. 
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In contrast to the Gaussian copula which shows a slight decrease in the optimal target for 
high correlation, the optimal target in this case remains unchanged as shown in Figure 3.14. The 
expected value gaps at target optimality are greater with the Clayton copula than with the 
Gaussian. 
 In contrast to the Gaussian copula which shows a slight decrease in the optimal 
target for high correlation, the optimal target in this case remains unchanged as shown in Figure 
3.14. The expected value gaps at target optimality are greater with the Clayton copula than with 
the Gaussian. 
 
 
Figure 3.12 The results show decreasing expected value gaps as the Clayton copula 
correlation parameter increases.  
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Figure 3.13 A closer view of the decreasing optimal target as more alternatives are available. 
 
 
Figure 3.14 A close view showing the optimal target is unchanged even for high θ values. 
 
3.4.3 Risk Aversion with an Efficient Frontier 
  When the decision alternatives’ mean and variance parameters have a uniform 
distribution, an increase in the organization’s risk aversion decreases the optimal target.  This 
section examines how this trend is affected by the presence of an efficient frontier. The 
simulation is run to calculate the expected value gap for different levels of organizational risk 
aversion when the decision alternatives lie along an efficient frontier represented by either a 
Gaussian or Clayton copula. The results for the Gaussian copula are shown in Figure 3.15. The 
results for the Clayton copula are shown in Figure 3.16.  
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Figure 3.15 Increases in risk aversion decrease the optimal target when a Gaussian copula 
describes the dependence between alternative mean and variance.  
 
 
Figure 3.16 Increases in risk aversion decrease the optimal target when a Clayton copula 
describes the dependence between alternative mean and variance. 
  
 The optimal target decreases with increases in risk aversion. This result is consistent with 
the results when the alternatives’ mean and variance parameters followed a uniform distribution. 
3.5.   Effects of the Parametric Model 
In the model, the decision alternatives have been assumed to have uncertain outcomes 
that follow Gaussian distributions. In practice, however, distributions may take any form. It is 
therefore important to examine whether the observed trends are sensitive to the type of 
parametric model used to describe uncertain outcomes.   
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To examine this question, a different parametric model is used. Not all parametric models 
are appropriate to use in the value gap model, however. For example, the exponential distribution 
is specified by a single parameter, and distributions with larger parameters stochastically 
dominate those with smaller parameters. This stochastic dominance leads to agreement between 
the manager and the organization regardless of the target set. The most appropriate models to 
examine are those that are flexible in shape in order to represent a wide range of distributions 
that may be observed in practice. The beta distribution is selected for this purpose. 
The beta distribution can take on a variety of shapes depending on the values of its two 
parameters, α and β.  Thus, a variety of applications rely on the beta distribution. In particular, 
risk analysis relies on both the Gaussian and beta distributions (Law and Kelton 1982, Moitra 
1990).  An illustration of the flexibility in shapes is shown in Figure 3.17. 
The beta probability distribution is given by 
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where  ,B    is the beta function given by 
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The beta function acts as a normalizing factor for the distribution. 
 
 
Figure 3.17 The beta distribution demonstrates wide flexibility in the shape of its distribution. 
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Representing decision alternatives with outcomes that follow beta distributions requires 
that the distribution over the parameters α and β be specified. When specifying this distribution, 
it is important to consider that the mean and the variance of the beta distribution are related to 
each other. Specifically, the mean is  
  BE X

 


, (3.7) 
and the variance is  
  
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2
.
B
Var X

   

  
 (3.8) 
The distribution over α and β will determine the distribution over the means and variances of the 
potential decision alternatives. The analysis considers two different distributions over α and β. 
First, a uniform distribution on the range (1, 11) is used for both α and β.  The resulting 
dispersion over the mean and variance as well as the expected value gap results are shown in 
Figure 3.19. Note that the dispersion over mean and variance does not demonstrate a strong 
tradeoff between changes in the mean and variance following the interpretation of decision 
alternatives on an efficient frontier.  
To represent decision alternatives along an efficient frontier, a different distribution over 
the parameters is required. A dispersion pattern that exhibits properties of an efficient frontier is 
obtained when α follows a scaled beta distribution, i.e.  4* 2,3Beta  , and β is uniformly 
distributed from 1 to 11. The dispersion and expected value gap results are presented in Figure 
3.20.  
The results in Figures 3.18 and 3.19 show some important insights. First, increasing the 
number of decision alternatives decreases the optimal target for both parameter distributions 
considered and for a wide range of risk attitudes. Second, increasing the organization’s risk 
aversion decreases the optimal target for both parameter distributions considered and for a wide 
range in the number of alternatives considered. Third, the slope of the expected value gap curve 
above the optimal target is flatter than the slope of the curve for targets less than optimal. 
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Figure 3.18 The dispersion and expected value gap results for a beta distribution with 
(1,11)U   and ~ (1,11)U . 
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Figure 3.19 The dispersion and expected value gap results for a beta distribution with 
 4* 2,3Beta   and ~ (1,11)U . 
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3.6.   Discussion and Conclusion 
This chapter shows that suboptimal targets lead to expected value gaps that are greater 
than necessary. Thus, organizations should carefully consider both their own risk attitude and the 
environment in which they operate prior to setting fixed targets. In particular, organizations 
should consider what types of decisions are being made by the managers and characterize its 
belief of the distribution of those alternatives.  The methods used to characterize this uncertainty 
may vary by industry. For example, in finance, a body of work studies uncertainties associated 
with the stock market (e.g. Connolly, Stivers and Sun 2005). In other industries, however, such 
resources for characterizing uncertainty may not exist.  
This chapter also characterizes how various factors affect the location of the optimal 
target. In particular, the following trends are observed. 
(i) Increases in the risk aversion decrease the optimal target. This result is robust to 
changes in the distribution of decision alternatives and is robust to changes in the 
parametric model used to represent decision alternatives.  
(ii) Increases in the number of available decision alternatives increase the optimal target. 
This result is robust to changes in the distribution of decision alternatives and is robust to 
changes in the parametric model used to represent decision alternatives.  
(iii) When decision alternatives are distributed along an efficient frontier, the expected 
value gap for targets greater than optimal is less than the expected value gap for targets 
less than optimal. This result is robust to the number of decision alternatives available, 
the organization’s risk aversion, and the model used to represent how increasing the 
expected value of an alternative increases the variance. This result is less pronounced 
when the alternatives are represented by beta distributions, but its presence is still 
observed in the difference in the slope of the expected value gap below and above the 
optimal target.  
An important implication of these results is the need for organizations to consider their own risk 
attitude and the uncertainties involved in the decisions being made by employees when setting 
any target. Even in the absence of explicit targets, however, these factors are important to 
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understanding how goals set by the employee may affect their decision making and the value 
capture of the organization. 
Another important insight of these results is that targets may be able to simultaneously 
improve decision making and effort of employees. The psychology literature shows that goals 
can increase both effort (Bandura and Cervone 1983, Hall and Foster 1977, Hamner and Harnett 
1974) and persistence (LaPorte and Nath 1967).  Studies examining how to set goals to elicit 
optimal results advocate the use of specific, challenging goals (Locke et al. 1981, Locke and 
Latham 2002). These goals are high but still viewed as realistic.  The concept of stretch goals is 
analogous to setting high targets for decision making. If the decision alternatives lie along an 
efficient frontier, setting a target that is too high results in a smaller value gap than one that is too 
small, suggesting organizations should err on the side of setting higher targets. Thus, the results 
presented in this chapter suggest some alignment between the effect of targets for decision 
making and the effect of targets for goals may be possible.  
The simulation-based approach presented in this paper is a useful tool for improving the 
performance of target based decision making. The method may be tailored to derive insights for 
a variety of organizational settings. It is generalizable to both the distribution of decision 
alternatives and the utility function of the organization. Further generalizations are also possible. 
For example, if the organization does not know the number of alternatives that will be available 
to the manager but can specify its belief about the probability of each number of alternatives, 
then the expected value gap may be calculated by conditioning on each possible number of 
alternatives.  
The flexibility and insightfulness of the simulation-based method for optimizing fixed 
targets enables organizations to apply it to their own operations and maximize the value captured 
by their managers.  
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4.   COOPERATIVE TARGETS  
 
4.1.   Cooperative Incentives 
Incentives can be used to influence behavior in a variety of ways depending on how they 
are constructed. Group or team incentives—as opposed to individual incentives—have been 
proposed as a way to encourage employees to work together. An example of group incentives is 
the concept of gainsharing, a practice in which a group is rewarded if the overall performance 
exceeds some standard (Graham-Moore and Ross 1983). While the specific construction of these 
incentives may vary (Markham et al. 1992, Welbourne and Gomez-Mejia 1995, Welbourne et al. 
1995), this chapter considers the general case of team incentives in the form of cooperative 
targets.  
Multiple treatments of teams exist in the literature with different assumptions associated 
with each. Marschak and Radner (1972) define teams as an organization in which the members 
have only common interests. The presence of a cooperative incentive is assumed to foster or 
create this common interest.  The treatment of teams with perfect information sharing is thus 
equivalent to the treatment of individuals with complications arising as information and 
coordination costs arise.  On the other hand, Holmstrom (1982) treats teams as collections of 
individuals working towards similar outputs without the assumption of common interests. This 
formulation explicitly studies problems of moral hazard in which outcomes but not actions are 
observed, leading to the situation in which team members can blame a poor outcome on each 
other’s actions. 
This chapter uses the value gap simulation model described in Chapter 2 to study 
cooperative targets under various assumptions of team structure and information sharing. First, 
the formulation of cooperative targets in the simulation model is presented in Section 4.2. The 
case of perfect information sharing and cooperation is presented in Section 4.3 while Section 4.4 
considers the effects of deviations from perfect cooperation, including the effect of imperfect 
information and costs associated with cooperation. Section 4.6 discusses the implications of the 
work.  
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4.2.   Problem Formulation 
The problem formulation in this chapter follows the same general form as the analysis in 
Chapters 2 and 3.  An organization sets a target T for a group of managers. The managers are 
tasked with making decisions on behalf of the organization. The organization is assumed to 
behave as a normative decision maker with a known risk aversion and utility function. The value 
gap is defined as the difference in the organization’s certain equivalent for its most preferred set 
of alternatives and its certain equivalent for the set of alternatives chosen by the managers.  
The notation is explained for the case in which the organization sets a cooperative target 
for two managers and is easily extended to the case of n managers. The managers are referred to 
as Manager 1 and Manager 2. Numeric subscripts are used to differentiate variables specific to 
each manager.  The random variable representing the output of each manager is denoted 
i
X  with 
mean 
i
  and variance 2
i
 .  The sum of the managers’ performances is denoted 
C
X  where the 
subscript c denotes this is the “cooperative” outcome, 
 
1 2
.
C
X X X  (4.1) 
The analysis considers decision alternatives with outcomes that follow a Gaussian 
distribution, a modeling decision supported by the results of Chapter 3. Based on the properties 
of Gaussian distributions, the distribution of 
C
X  is Gaussian with mean and variance given by 
 
1 2
2 2 2
1 2 1,2 1 2
C
C
  
     
 
  
 (4.2) 
where 
1,2
  is the Pearson correlation coefficient between the outcomes of Manager 1 and 
Manager 2. If the outcomes of the decision alternatives are independent, the correlation will be 
zero.  
 Under perfect cooperation, the selected alternative 
C
a  is the one with the greatest 
probability of meeting the cooperative target,  
  arg max 1 ( )C ca F T  (4.3) 
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where ( )
c
F   is the cumulative normal distribution with mean 
c
 and variance 2.
c
  
The organization’s preferred alternative is the one with the greatest expected utility, and 
it values this alternative according to its certain equivalent. Let the certain equivalent of 
alternative i  be denoted 
i
a .  The organization’s selection, denoted ,Oa  is therefore 
  1arg max ( ) ( )O ia U f x U x dx                                         (4.4) 
where  U x  denotes the organization’s utility function  and  if x  denotes the probability 
density over profit for alternative i.  The value gap is denoted VG  and is the difference in the 
organization’s certain equivalents for the project that would have been most preferred by the 
organization and the project that is selected by the managers, 
.
O C
VG a a                                                             (4.5) 
 The expected value gap is calculated using these definitions and the simulation method 
described in Chapter 2. 
4.3.   Perfect Cooperation 
The first case examined is that of perfect cooperation in which the two managers examine 
the set of alternatives represented by all possible combinations of the individual alternatives and 
select pair of alternatives that maximize the probability of attaining the target. The expected 
value gap for this perfect cooperation is compared to the expected value gap that results as the 
sum of two separate decision makers with individual targets in Figure 4.1. The results clearly 
indicate that the use of cooperative targets with perfect cooperation results in an expected value 
gap that is lower than the expected value gap for individual targets for all possible targets.  
These results are consistent with the decreases in the expected value gap observed in 
Chapter 3 when the decision alternatives approach an efficient frontier. The effect of creating a 
set of decision alternatives that is the convolution or sum of two random variables is to change 
the underlying distribution of decision alternatives available to the decision maker(s). The 
distribution of the sum of two uniform random variables has a triangular shape. Similar 
triangular shapes are used in various applications as approximations of the Gaussian distribution  
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Figure 4.1. Perfect cooperation results in a smaller expected value gap than individual targets. 
 
(Rydberg 1997). Thus, the distribution of decision alternatives in perfect cooperation 
approximates the distribution of the Gaussian copula over a scaled domain.   Figure 4.2 
illustrates the difference in distribution for alternatives when parameters are uniformly 
distributed and when parameters are the convolution of two uniform random variables. Further, 
increasing the number of managers increases the number of uniform random variables in the sum 
with the result converging to the Gaussian distribution by the Central Limit Theorem. The results 
obtained with cooperative targets can be replicated for individual targets by specifying the 
distribution over alternatives’ mean and variance parameters that is equivalent to the convolution 
of random variables that occurs for the cooperative target. 
 
 
Figure 4.2. (Left) Alternatives with uniformly distributed mean and variance.  
(Right) Alternatives with mean and variance that are the sum of uniform random variables. 
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In the special case of perfect information sharing,  Marschak and Radner (1972) show 
that solutions for the one-person problem can be immediately applied to the team setting. This 
finding is the same for target-based decision making.  With perfect cooperation and information 
sharing, the only difference between the individual target and the cooperative target is the change 
in the distribution over the decision alternatives’ parameters.  
4.4.   Deviations from Perfect Cooperation 
This section considers several relaxations from the case of perfect cooperation. 
Specifically, the cases of partial cooperation, costs associated with cooperation, and asymmetric 
information are examined.  
4.4.1. Partial Cooperation, Perfect Information 
Perfect cooperation may not always be attainable.  The effect of partial cooperation is 
therefore examined. Partial cooperation is defined as the case in which a cooperative target is set, 
but each manager relies on his/her belief about the other manager’s performance when making a 
decision. The managers do not communicate their sets of available alternatives with each other. 
Rather, each manager calculates the convolution of the available alternatives with single random 
variable representing beliefs about the other manager’s performance.  
Figure 4.3 presents the expected value gap for partial cooperation in which the 
alternatives’ parameters are uniformly distributed and the managers each use the actual (true) 
mean and variance of the distribution of parameters available to the other manager. Although it is 
clear that partial cooperation results in expected value gaps that are consistently larger than those 
of perfect cooperation, the magnitude of the difference is relatively small. The largest difference 
in Figure 4.3 occurs at a target of 2, and the difference is approximately 0.01. The reason for the 
observed similarity in the curves is illuminated by examining how partial cooperation affects the 
underlying distribution of alternatives.  
 Partial cooperation effectively shifts the distribution of the decision alternatives by 
amounts determined by the manger’s belief of the other manger’s performance. In the case of no 
correlation between the outcomes of the two manager’s decisions, the alternatives shift in the 
mean-variance domain by amounts equal to the mean and variance of the other manager’s 
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Figure 4.3. Partial cooperation results in a larger expected value gap than perfect cooperation 
even with perfect information of the distribution faced by the other manager. 
 
performance. The shifts when both managers face a uniform distribution across the parameters 
are shown in Figure 4.4.  The horizontal shifts in the alternatives’ means are represented in the 
expected value gap as the shift in the optimal target by an amount equal to the shift in the mean. 
The effect of shifting the variance is next considered in isolation of the shift in the mean as 
shown in Figure 4.5.  As the alternatives shift upward in the mean-variance domain, the iso-
preference curves of the manger become more vertical, matching the risk-neutral organization’s 
preferences more closely. 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Partial cooperation shifts the mean and variance of available alternatives. 
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Figure 4.5. Shifting a set of alternatives upwards in the mean-variance domain results in iso-
preference curves that are straighter (dark curves) than before the shift (light curves). 
 
An alternative way of explaining the relationship is to note that the shifted distribution 
(partial cooperation) shifts the uniform distribution to the section of the domain in which the 
correlated distribution (perfect cooperation) has the greatest density. Thus, while the two 
distributions are not equal, they share similar characteristics resulting in similar expected value 
gaps. 
4.4.2. Partial Cooperation, Imperfect Information 
The results of partial cooperation are dependent upon the accuracy of each manager’s 
estimation of the other manager’s performance. The analysis can be extended to include the 
effect of errors in these judgments. Figure 4.6 illustrates the effect of uniform judgment errors on   
 
 
Figure 4.6. With partial cooperation, the optimal target remains unchanged for symmetric 
errors in the judgment of others’ performances  
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the expected value gap where each manager’s estimation of the other manager’s performance is 
uniformly distributed around the actual parameter with a maximum error of 5% or 10% above 
and below. Interestingly, the optimal target remains unchanged for these symmetric errors. The 
magnitude of the expected value gap, however, increases as the magnitude of the errors 
increases. 
 If errors are systematically above or below the true value, however, the optimal target 
shifts. Figure 4.7 shows the effect on the expected value gap for uniform errors in judgment that 
are up to 10% below the true value (underestimation) or that are up to 10% above the true value 
(overestimation). The optimal target decreases if managers systematically underestimate their 
colleagues’ average performance, and the optimal target increases if managers systematically 
overestimate their colleagues’ average performance.  
4.4.3. Costs of Cooperation 
In comparing cooperative targets to individual targets, there appears to be a significant 
advantage to setting cooperative targets due to the effective transformation of the distribution of 
alternatives that occurs as a result of the convolution of random variables. In practice, however, 
there are often costs associated with forming teams (Marschak and Radner 1972). For example, 
costs arise in the time required to communicate information between the managers. Thus, it is  
 
 
Figure 4.7. The optimal target shifts down for systematic underestimation and up for 
systematic overestimation. 
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not possible to create ever larger teams and continue to reduce expected value gap. As the team 
increases in size, any costs associated with cooperation also increase. These costs are directly 
added to the expected value gap, shifting it upward linearly with the costs of coordination. 
The difference between the expected value gap for setting individual targets and the 
expected value gap for the cooperative targets places an upper bound on the costs associated with 
cooperation. If the costs exceed the savings obtained with the cooperative target, then individual 
targets—or cooperative targets for smaller groups with smaller coordination costs—should be 
pursued.  
4.5.   Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the case of cooperative targets. The effect of setting a 
cooperative target is to effectively change the underlying distribution of alternatives available to 
the managers. In the case of perfect, costless cooperation, a direct equivalence exists between an 
individual target with a distribution equivalent to the distribution created by cooperation and a 
cooperative target.  
The effect of cooperation is shown to follow the results observed in the case of an 
individual target in which the decision alternatives lie along an efficient frontier. Specifically, as 
the number of managers cooperating increases, the distribution of the sum of their outputs 
approaches a Gaussian distribution following the Central Limit Theorem. This result coincides 
with the use of the Gaussian copula to represent an efficient frontier in Chapter 3. 
The effect of partial cooperation and imperfect information is also examined. It is shown 
that even without full cooperation, the shifts in the distribution that occur with partial 
cooperation result in distributions that are similar to the full cooperation case, leading to 
reductions in the expected value gap. The effect of symmetric information errors is to increase 
the magnitude of the expected value gap while leaving the optimal target unchanged. Systematic 
errors of overestimation or underestimation lead to systematic upward or downward shifts in the 
optimal target. Finally, the effect of costs of cooperation is discussed as placing bounds on the 
size of teams making decisions with a cooperative target. 
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5.   BEHAVIORAL CONSIDERATIONS:   
EFFECTS OF INCENTIVES & DESCRIPTIVE DECISION MAKING 
 
5.1.   The Disciplines of Descriptive Decision Making 
Throughout this work, certain assumptions have been made about how different entities 
make decisions. The organization is assumed to follow utility theory and prefer the decision 
alternative that maximizes expected utility. The manager is assumed to follow the target that is 
set and to seek the alternative that maximizes the probability of attaining this target. In practice, 
however, the decisions made may not follow normative predictions. It is therefore important to 
understand how decisions may deviate from the normative predictions.  
The descriptive literature examines how people behave in practice and is distinct from the 
normative literature that examines how an individual ought to behave to be consistent with 
axioms of rational thought.  Because of the emphasis on actual behavior, the descriptive 
literature has a strong foundation in experimental work. The literature on incentives and 
descriptive decision making has emerged from work in the disciplines of both economics and 
psychology.   
Experimental economics is a broad field that uses experiments to derive insights to 
human behavior in all areas of economics. Some of the broad areas studied include industrial 
organization (Chamberlain 1948, Plott 1982), game theory (Flood 1958, Rapoport and Orwant 
1962), and individual choice (Smith and Walker 1993, Camerer 1995), among others.  A 
common feature of these experiments is that the participants’ behavior during the experiment 
affects the payment they receive (Roth 1995).  The work on individual choice considers both 
judgment tasks and decision making under uncertainty (Camerer 1995). It is the portion of 
experimental economics most relevant to the current work. Important insights from this area are 
discussed in greater detail throughout this chapter.  
The psychology literature is concerned with patterns of behavior and cognition pertinent 
to decision making. It is similar to the economics literature in the use of experiments to study 
decision making behavior (e.g. Preston and Baratta 1948, Edwards 1953, 1954) and in the 
development of models to describe predictable patterns of behavior (Janis and Mann 1977).  The 
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main difference between the work in economics and psychology lies in the design of the 
experiments.  In particular, although some psychologists advocate the economists’ approach of 
using monetary incentives based on performance (Hertwig and Ortman 2001), the majority of 
experiments in the psychology literature tend to pay flat participation rates (Smith 1991, Read 
2005).   
The work of both fields may be viewed as part of the canon of descriptive decision 
making literature.  Decision analysis as a field includes both descriptive and normative models 
(Bell, Raiffa, and Tversky 1988) and as a result overlaps with the work on decision making in 
both economics and psychology.  
The remainder of this chapter draws from the descriptive decision making literature to 
examine in greater depth several behavioral considerations in the study of incentives, including 
both general results and results specific to decision making. Section 5.2 explains the different 
types of tasks used in behavioral experiments while Section 5.3 outlines commonly used 
incentive structures. Section 5.4 discusses the use of random lottery incentives. Section 5.5 
highlights experimental results concerning probability judgments. Sections 5.6 and 5.7 examine 
the use of standard gambles in choice experiments and their results. Finally, Section 5.8 poses 
questions that remain unresolved in the literature.  
5.2.   The Effect of Task Type 
An important first question to ask when studying incentives is whether or not the 
presence of an incentive affects behavior in the first place. To examine whether or not incentives 
have a positive effect on agent performance, experiments compare behavior when no 
performance contingent incentives is present to behavior when performance contingent 
incentives are present. An important component of the experimental design is the type of task 
under investigation. In a review of 131 studies, Bonner et al. (2000) report the fraction of studies 
showing positive incentive effects, i.e. studies reporting that incentives produce the desired 
effects on behavior, according to task type. These results are illustrated in Figure 5.1 for four 
common task types. As the complexity of the task increases, the fraction of studies showing 
positive results decreases. In particular, only 42% of studies reviewed reported positive incentive 
effects for judgment and decision tasks. Several factors may affect these observed results. 
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Figure 5.1. The fraction of studies reviewed that show positive incentive effects, as reported 
by Bonner et al. (2000).  
 
Two explanations are posited to for the reasons this low rate of positive incentive effects 
is observed in the literature for judgment and decision making tasks. The first reason is that 
many of these tasks are designed specifically to induce well known cognitive biases. The second 
reason is that due to the increased complexity of judgment and decision making tasks, additional 
factors may affect the results that are not identified and therefore not accounted for. 
Many judgment and decision making tasks have been designed to test whether the 
presence of incentives can eliminate the effect of well documented, widely recognized cognitive 
biases. For this type of experiment, the tasks are designed specifically around a cognitive bias. 
For example, the representativeness heuristic describes the tendency of people to assign higher 
probabilities to events that share characteristics with a particular pattern (Kahneman and Tversky 
1972). Several judgment studies examined specifically incorporate this bias (Grether 1980, El-
Gamal and Grether 1995). Other studies reviewed incorporate the anchoring and adjustment bias 
(Wright and Anderson 1989), and the conjunction fallacy (Awasthi and Pratt 1990). These 
studies come to the important conclusion that cognitive biases cannot be eliminated by paying 
for better performance, but they also serve to depress the reported fraction of judgment and 
decision making experiments showing positive incentive results.   
Another reason for the low rate of positive incentive effects may be the effect of factors 
that are unaccounted for. The complexity of judgment and decision tasks means that many 
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factors can be involved in performance. The experimental literature, for example, has identified 
grading leniency (Hogarth et al. 1991), affective mood (Mano 1994, Loewenstein and Lerner 
2003, Fehr-Duda et al. 2011), perceived time constraints (Kocher and Sutter 2006) and the 
cognitive ability of the participants (Awasthi and Pratt 1990) as factors that affect performance 
under incentives. It is possible that in some experiments, unidentified confounding factors exist. 
The complexity inherent in judgment and decision making tasks underscores the difficulty in 
examining the effect of incentives on these tasks.  
5.3.   The Structure of Lottery Questions for Decision Tasks 
Experiments involving decision tasks are frequently concerned with decisions over 
alternatives in which the outcomes are uncertain. These uncertain outcomes are generally 
referred to as lotteries or standard gambles. Often, the experimental subject is shown two 
uncertain deals and asked to select the one that is more preferred. The questions can be 
formulated in several ways using either visual or verbal representations of uncertainty. 
Visual representations of lottery questions take a few different forms. One approach is to 
use a pie chart to represent the uncertainties of the outcomes (Grether and Plott 1979, Reilly 
1982, Wilcox 1993). Another approach is to use stacked bars with the relative length of the bar 
representing the probability of that outcome (Camerer 1989, Beattie and Loomes 1997, Cubbitt 
et al. 1998).  Figure 5.2 illustrates these two representations for a sample pair of lottery questions 
used by Grether and Plott (1979).  
 
 
Figure 5.2. Two visual representations of uncertainty used in lottery questions. 
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Figure 5.3. A verbal representation of uncertainty in a lottery question. 
 
A second approach is to represent the uncertainty verbally. In this format, two 
alternatives are usually listed that describe the probability of each outcome (Allais 1953, Battalio 
et al. 1990). Figure 5.3 illustrates a sample verbal representation for the same pair of lotteries 
shown in Figure 5.2. In addition to using either visual or verbal representations of uncertainty, 
some researchers have used both types and do not report differences in response patterns based 
on this (Beattie and Loomes 1997).  
Although asking for the preferred lottery out of a pair is commonly used in behavioral 
experiments, it is worth noting that other approaches also exist.  Questions may be structured to 
ask participants to place a bet of any amount on an event with a given probability (Rosett 1971).  
Or they may ask participants questions in terms of certain equivalents for lotteries (Swalm 1966, 
Tversky 1967, Barnes and Reinmuth 1976) or may ask participants questions in terms of 
probabilities in a given lottery (Green 1963). While several modes of asking questions exists, it 
must be noted that participants’ responses have been demonstrated to be affected by the type of 
question used in the experiment (Hershey et al. 1980, Keller 1985, Tversky et al. 1990).  
5.4.   The Types of Incentive Structures Used 
In addition to varying by task type, behavioral experiments vary in the type of incentive 
structure employed. Some experiments pay only a flat-rate for participation while others base the 
incentive on a participant’s performance. This section describes some of the most common types 
of performance based incentives, including piece rate, competitive, lottery, and fixed-bonus 
incentives. 
Option A 
35 chances in 36 to win $4 
1 chance in 36 to lose $1  
 
Option B 
11 chances in 36 to win $16 
25 chances in 36 to lose $1.50  
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Piece rate incentives: Piece rate incentives pay participants a multiplier of some measure 
of a task to determine the total reward. The measure used depends on the task under examination. 
Effort-based tasks use a measure of units completed, such as number of correct recalls in a 
memory task (Harley 1965, Weiner 1966) or number of products assembled from parts (Pinder 
1976, Bailey et al. 1998). Judgment-based tasks use measures of the number of correct 
judgments, such as questions on an IQ test (Gneezy and Rustichini 2000, Pokorny 2008) or 
calculations of probability (Awasthi and Pratt 1990).  
Competitive incentives: Competitive incentives are sometimes also referred to as 
tournaments. Under this incentive structure, participants are asked to complete a task, and a 
particular aspect of their completion is measured. The participants are rank ordered according to 
the measure of performance, and the participant with the top rank is rewarded. Competitive 
incentives can also be structured such that the top n performances are rewarded, sometimes with 
different amounts based on ranking. This approach has been used by numerous researchers of 
judgment and decision tasks (e.g. Wright and Aboul-Ezz 1988, Eger and Dickhaut 1982, 
Sterman 1989, Wright and Anderson 1989, Ashton 1990, Gigerenzer et al. 1991, Remus et al. 
1998).   
Lottery incentives: A lottery incentive is one in which the size of the reward is 
determined by the outcome of an uncertain deal. The participant is given a choice between two 
lotteries that have different probabilities of different outcomes. The participant selects the lottery 
s/he prefers, and the incentive is based on the outcome of the lottery. This type of incentive is 
specific to decision tasks in which the outcome of each decision alternative is uncertain. It is 
considered standard for these choice tasks (e.g. Grether and Plott 1979, Camerer 1989, Battalio 
et al. 1990, Hogarth et al. 1991, Wilcox 1993).  
Fixed bonus incentives: Fixed bonus incentives pay the participant a set, fixed amount if 
a given outcome is observed. This payment scheme has been used in probability judgment tasks. 
For example, the participant may be asked to indicate which of two outcomes is more likely, and 
the participant is paid if the outcome indicated as more likely is observed (Grether 1980). As 
another example, the participant may be asked to answer questions and be given a fixed payment 
if the percentage of correct answers is above a threshold (Stone and Ziebart 1995). The fixed 
bonus incentive is the type of incentive used when a fixed target is present.  
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A majority of studies in the literature compare subject performance under one of these 
types of incentives to performance when no incentive is present. A few notable exceptions also 
compare performance between different types of incentives. Piece rate incentives have been 
compared to competitive incentives in probability judgment tasks (Arkes et al 1986) and in 
choice tasks (Bull et al. 1987).  
5.5.   The Random Lottery Design in Experiments 
For experiments that involve the lottery and some forms of fixed bonus incentives, 
another important issue is how many questions will be asked and which of those questions will 
determine incentive pay. Two approaches that have been studied in the literature are the real 
choice design and the random lottery design.  
In the real choice design, the participant is asked to make only one decision over 
uncertain payoffs. The uncertain deal is then simulated with the participant receiving the 
observed payoff. This design carries the clear limitation of only being able to get information on 
one question posed to the participant. To repeat real payoffs for a series of deals would not only 
be expensive to conduct, but the participant’s selections in later questions could be affected by 
the outcomes of previous decisions (Cho and Luce 1995, Cox and Epstein 1989, Thaler and 
Johnson 1990, Kameda and Davis 1990).  
Another approach is known as the random lottery design. The random lottery design asks 
the participant to make multiple decisions in which only one of the decisions will be selected to 
be played for real at the end of the experiment. This approach has the benefit of gathering data 
on several sets of alternatives and avoids the problem of outcomes from one decision affecting 
choices made in future decisions. It is a common experimental design in the study of choice 
(Allais 1953, Grether and Plott 1979, Reilly 1982, Rosett 1971, Tversky 1967). The approach, 
however, has not escaped criticism.  
Some researchers have argued that the random lottery design does not elicit preferences 
for single decisions; rather, the participant is effectively creating a compound lottery or portfolio 
of possibilities by answering the questions (Holt 1986). It is argued that because the selections 
are effectively part of a portfolio, the alternative selected in one of these decisions may not be the 
most preferred if the same decision were faced in isolation of other decisions.  This argument is 
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supported by models of descriptive decision making in which the addition or removal of 
alternatives can affect preferences over other alternatives, models such as rank-dependent theory 
(Quiggin 1982, Yaari 1987) or weighted utility theory (Chew 1983, Fishburn 1983). These 
arguments are contradicted, however, by models of descriptive decision making that do not allow 
the addition or removal of alternatives to affect the preference for a given alternative, models 
such as prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).  
To test the mettle of the arguments, several experiments have been conducted to compare 
responses in a random lottery design to selections made in a real choice (single real decision) 
design.  The results of these experiments show that participants’ selections under the random 
lottery design are consistent with choices under the real choice design, supporting the use of the 
random lotteries in experiments (Camerer 1989, Starmer and Sugden 1991, Beattie and Loomes 
1997, Cubbitt et al. 1998). Random lottery incentives are now considered a standard part of 
experiments on judgment and decision making in economics contexts (Baltussen et al. 2011).  
5.6.   General Results of Performance in the Presence of Incentives 
Experiments studying the effects of incentives have generally tried to answer the question 
of whether the presence of incentives affects behavior, and if so, how. The literature has several 
examples of experiments reporting conflicting findings. In reviews of the literature, however, 
several trends emerge. Among these trends are the reduced variance in performance with 
incentives, the persistence of cognitive biases, and the important role of moderating factors that 
affect behavior other than the presence or absence of incentives.  
Several large reviews of the literature report that the variance of subject performance is 
reduced when incentives are present compared to when they are not (Camerer and Hogarth, 
1991, Simth and Walker 1993). This trend is consistent whether the average performance with 
incentives is improved (e.g. Castellan 1969, Jamal and Sunder 1991, Harrison 1994) or worsened 
(e.g. McGraw and McCullers 1979, Hogarth et al. 1991, Friedman 1998). The fact that 
performance can improve or worsen based on incentives is likely moderated by other aspects of 
the experimental design and in particular the type of task. 
The type of task used in an experiment is an important factor that affects the results. For 
some tasks added effort improves performance, while for others, added effort may have no effect 
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or may even decrease performance. Thus, whether or not effort improves performance is linked 
to whether or not the presence of incentives will improve performance (Camerer and Hogarth 
1991, Libby and Lipe 1992, Bonner et al. 2000). This result is linked to the moderating role of 
individual skill in task performance (Ericsson et al. 1993). 
Throughout the literature, cognitive biases have been shown to persist even in the 
presence of incentives (Camerer and Hogarth 1991, Read 2005). Some studies report a reduction 
in the magnitude of the bias, but no experiment has been able to eliminate biases on the basis of 
incentives.  
The effects of incentives are complex.  In addition to trends identified across the 
literature, several other moderating factors have been noted. Bonner et al. (2000) stress that the 
type of incentive mechanism used likely interacts with the task type and has a strong effect on 
the results. A lack of literature in this area, however, precludes a meta-analysis of this effect. The 
effect of incentives is also dependent on other variables such as cognitive capital (Camerer and 
Hogarth 1991, Awasthi and Pratt 1990), grading leniency (Hogarth et al. 1991), affective mood 
(Mano 1994, Loewenstein and Lerner 2003, Fehr-Duda et al. 2011), and perceived time 
constraints (Kocher and Sutter 2006).   
5.7.   Results of Experiments on Decision Tasks 
Experiments of behavioral decision making have examined whether people follow the 
normative predictions of utility theory and to identify patterns in behavior. The literature is 
replete with examples of decision makers violating various tenets of utility theory. Some of the 
most common violations are described. 
Framing effects: Framing effects describe the phenomenon in which the wording used to 
describe a decision alternative affects the decision maker’s preference for that alternative. The 
effect of wording on preferences is a violation of the axioms of utility because it implies that the 
decision maker’s preferences are not stable or depend on irrelevant factors. The results of several 
experiments show that framing the same outcomes as losses versus gains changes subjects’ 
preferences for alternatives (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, Tversky and Kahneman 1986). The 
presence or absence of context with a question also affects results (Hershey et al. 1982). 
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Preference reversals: Preference reversals occur when a decision maker indicates 
contradictory preferences for the same alternatives (Grether and Plott 1979, Slovic and 
Lichtenstein 1983, Goldstein and Einhorn 1987, Karni and Safra 1987, Johnson et al. 1989, 
Bostic et al. 1990). Preference reversals indicate a lack of stable preferences and therefore are a 
violation of normative utility theory. Although preference reversals are particularly problematic 
because they raise questions of whether participants’ responses in an experiment represent their 
true preferences, evidence suggests that a contributing factor to preference reversals is the effect 
of question format on participants’ responses (Tversky et al. 1990). Preference reversals that are 
observed from responses to different types of questions may be a result of variance in the 
procedure and not true preference reversals. 
The stability of preferences when all outcomes are shifted by the same amount (i.e. the 
delta property in Howard and Abbas 2015) has also been studied.  Preferences are least stable 
when shifts move the alternatives from either all positive or all negative to a mix of positive and 
negative outcomes (Payne et al. 1980).  
Ambiguity aversion: Ambiguity or uncertainty aversion refers to the demonstrated 
preference for alternatives with clearly defined probabilities over alternatives in which the 
probabilities are unclear (Ellsberg 1961, Einhorn and Hogarth 1985, Epstein 1999). The results 
extend to participants’ preferences for simple over compound lotteries (Halevy 2007). Ambiguity 
aversion, however, is strongly related to the act of comparing alternatives with different sources 
of uncertainty. The effects of ambiguity aversion can be diminished or eliminated by presenting 
an uncertain alternative to a decision maker in isolation of other alternatives (Fox and Tversky 
1995, Fox and Weber 2002).  
Certainty effect: The certainty effect describes the strong preference people display for 
certain outcomes over uncertain outcomes, even when the uncertainty is very small (Allais 1953, 
Slovic and Tversky 1974, Kahneman and Tversky 1979). The effect is famously illustrated by 
the Allais paradox in which decision makers are given the following two decisions, each with 
two alternatives (Allais 1953): 
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 Decision 1: 
 Alternative 1.A. 100% chance of $1 million. 
 Alternative 1.B. 89% chance of $1 million; 10% chance of $5 million, 1% chance of $0. 
 Decision 2: 
 Alternative 2.A. 89% chance of $0; 11% chance of $1 million. 
 Alternative 2.B. 90% chance of $0; 10% chance of $5 million. 
 Many decision makers select alternative 1.A and alternative 2.B contrary to normative 
predictions. This pairing of selections demonstrates the strong preference shown by decision 
makers for certainty over prospects that have only very small deviations from certainty. The 
certainty effect has been replicated in other experiments with small changes in probabilities or 
probabilities near certainty (Machina 1987, Battalio et al. 1990, Prelec 1990). Experiments have 
also shown people valuing an uncertain lottery lower than the worst possible outcome (Gneezy et 
al. 2006, Simonsohn 2009).  
Stochastic dominance violations: Stochastic dominance exists when the alternatives’ 
outcomes have probability distributions that meet criteria such that a normative decision maker 
will always prefer one alternative over the other (Fishburn 1964, Hadar and Russell 1969, 
Rothschild and Stiglitz 1970). First order stochastic dominance means that any decision maker 
who prefers more of a measure to less should prefer the dominating alternative. Second order 
stochastic dominance means that any risk-averse decision maker who prefers more of a measure 
to less should prefer the dominating alternative.  For a review of why these conditions hold, see 
Hadar and Russell (1974) or Howard and Abbas (2015).  
In spite of the normative predictions, however, behavioral experiments show that people 
sometimes violate stochastic dominance in their decisions (Birnbaum and Navarrete 1998, 
Birnbaum 2004, Levy 2008). These observations represent violations of normative predictions as 
well as several descriptive models of choice and thus have become a source of debate in the 
literature.  See, for example, the exchange between Wakker (2003) and Levy and Levy (2002). 
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5.8.   Further Questions 
This chapter reports the experimental findings of how incentives affect behavior 
generally and also the findings of experiments specific to decision making over uncertain 
prospects. The presence of incentives is shown to affect behavior and in many cases improve 
performance, although the precise effects are influenced by several factors (Bonner et al. 2000).   
Judgment and decision tasks are reported to have among the lowest rates of improved 
performance with incentive structures where improved performance is defined by normative 
predictions. These low rates are likely due to the finding that incentives cannot eliminate 
cognitive biases. Incentives do not remove patterns of decision making that violate normative 
predictions and also cannot remove stochastic dominance violations of descriptive decision 
making predictions.   
If one is concerned about the control of decision making behavior in an organization, and 
in particular is concerned with designing an incentive system to align the preferences of a 
principal and an agent, then these findings raise further questions about the predictability of 
decision making behavior under a given incentive scheme. Specifically, some questions of 
interest include: 
 What factors affect the predictability of decisions made with a lottery incentive? 
 What factors affect the predictability of decisions made with a fixed bonus (i.e. target 
based) incentive? 
 Are decisions with a lottery incentive more or less predictable than decisions with a 
fixed bonus (i.e. target based) incentive? 
These questions are particularly important given the lack of experiments on decision making that 
compare decisions with different types of incentives. Laboratory based experiments on target-
based decision making in comparison to lottery-based decision making are currently lacking in 
the literature. This gap is addressed by the behavioral experiments presented in the next chapter.  
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6.   A BEHAVIORAL EXPERIMENT: 
TARGET VERSUS NON-TARGET BASED DECISION MAKING 
 
6.1.   Introduction 
An important component of designing incentive structures to influence behavior in a 
desired way is verifying whether individuals will behave as predicted. Because experimental 
studies of decision making show a variety of violations of normative decision making 
(Schoemaker 1982, Camerer and Weber 1993, Keys and Schwartz 2007), it is important to 
understand factors that affect these violations. This chapter describes a behavioral experiment 
that uses the comparison of target-based and non-target based decisions to examine the relative 
benefits of different incentive structures and also to examine fundamental questions about 
descriptive decision making. 
The majority of experiments on decision making behavior use a lottery-based incentive in 
which the payment equals the outcome of the decision (e.g. Grether and Plott 1979, Camerer 
1989, Battalio et al. 1990, Hogarth et al. 1991, Wilcox 1993).  Relatively few studies examine 
the effect of target based decision making.  Experiments related to target based decision making 
are formulated as judgment tasks in which participants are asked to indicate which event is more 
likely (Grether 1980) and are paid accordingly. Related empirical work includes marketing 
models of choice behavior in which consumers’ decisions are fitted to a multivariate threshold 
model (Kau and Hill 1972, Bettman 1974).  However, there do not appear to be results directly 
comparing target based decision making to non-target based decision making. The experiment 
presented in this chapter provides such a direct comparison, and also provides insight to decision 
making behavior in general.  
Target-based decisions are distinct from non-target based settings in that a clear 
preference exists: maximize the probability of attaining the target. The accuracy of the target-
based decisions is therefore a measure of the accuracy of perceptions of the probability of 
attaining the target. In a non-target based setting, however, the subjects’ preferences are less 
clear, leading to a variety of proposed models to describe these preferences. A comparison of 
target and non-target based decision making facilitates insights to the roles of probability 
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perception and preferences for uncertain outcomes in decision making. In particular, can decision 
making behavior be predicted by properties of the decision alternatives alone?  
A choice-based experiment has been designed to test hypotheses about factors that affect 
the predictability of decision making.  Study participants are presented with a choice between 
two deals with uncertain outcomes represented either visually or as a sample of prior outcomes. 
For target-based decisions, the normative selection is the alternative with the higher probability 
of attaining the target. It is expected that as the difference between the two alternatives’ 
probabilities of meeting the target increases, more decisions will follow normative predictions 
because the better alternative (i.e. the larger probability) is easier to discern.  These expectations 
follow research in numerical cognition that shows it becomes more difficult to discern the 
difference between two numbers as they approach each other (Mover and Landauer 1967, Longo 
and Lourenco 2007).  
For non-target based decisions, the normative selection is determined by stochastic 
dominance relationships between the alternatives. For questions with visual representations of 
uncertainty, the two alternatives exhibit second order stochastic dominance meaning that the two 
have the same mean but difference variances. For questions with uncertainty represented by 
sample sets of prior outcomes, a mix of first order and second order stochastic dominance is 
present. Questions with first order stochastic dominance have one alternative with a higher mean 
and lower variance than the other alternative.  Following the same logic used in the predictions 
of target-based decisions, it is expected that as the difference between the alternatives’ variances 
(second order stochastic dominance) or means (first order stochastic dominance) increases, the 
fraction of decisions consistent with normative predictions will increase.  
Violations of stochastic dominance in choice experiments have been reported previously 
in the literature (Birnbaum and Navarrete 1998, Birnbaum 2004).  The authors of these studies 
have raised alarm, noting that such choices violate not only utility theory but also several other 
models of descriptive decision making including rank dependent utility theory and cumulative 
prospect theory. Different descriptive models have been proposed that predict violations of first 
order stochastic dominance under certain conditions, e.g. the configural weight method proposed 
by Birnbaum and McIntosh (1996).  However, many of the stochastic dominance violations 
involve experimental designs that elicit certain equivalents for uncertain deals individually, and 
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the subjects do not directly compare the uncertain deals. Direct choice comparisons have been 
shown to yield different results than comparing separate, individual judgments (Bostic et al. 
1990). Similar methods have been criticized as contributing to observations of preference 
reversals (Luce 1992).  Further, when subjects are allowed to directly compare two alternatives, 
many of the first order violations disappear (Levy 2008).  
  The treatment of stochastic dominance in the experiment presented in this chapter is 
distinct from the literature in a few ways. A majority of the questions exhibit second order 
stochastic dominance—not first order. The questions are also designed to assess the effect of 
increasing the difference in variance between the pair of decision alternatives on the fraction of 
normative decisions made.  
In addition, the experiment examines effects of how the uncertainty in the decision 
alternatives is presented. Both visual representations of uncertainty are used as well as sample 
sets of prior outcomes. Visual representations of uncertainty are associated with higher rates of 
normative decision making than verbal representations (Keller 1985), but it is unclear how they 
compare to other representation of uncertainty.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 explains the research 
hypotheses. Section 6.3 describes the experimental methods. Section 6.4 presents the results for 
each hypothesis.  Finally, Section 6.5 discusses the results, and Section 6.7 provides concluding 
remarks.  
6.2.   Hypotheses 
The experiment is designed to provide general insight to decision making under target 
and non-target based incentives and is also formulated to test several hypotheses related to the 
type of incentive structure and the representation of uncertainty in the decision alternatives. 
Several hypotheses refer to the predictability of the participants’ decision making behavior. 
Throughout this chapter, the word “predictable” is used to mean “follows normative 
predictions.”  
The specific hypotheses and their rationales are as follows.   
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 Hypothesis 1: Target-based decisions follow normative predictions more closely that 
outcome-based decisions when uncertainty is represented visually. 
  This hypothesis is based on the observation that the optimal strategy with a target-based 
incentive requires only an estimation of probability whereas the optimal strategy with an 
outcome-based incentive requires consideration of both probability and preferences for uncertain 
outcomes. Optimal decision making with a target-based incentive requires fewer cognitive 
processes. By eliminating the consideration of individual preferences, it removes individual 
preferences as a source of variability in responses, leading to the hypothesis that target-based 
decisions follow normative predictions more closely than outcome-based incentives. 
 Hypothesis 2: When uncertainty is represented visually, target-based decisions are more 
predictable when the difference between the alternatives’ probabilities of attaining the 
target is greater. 
A well-known result in numerical cognition is that it becomes more difficult to discern 
the difference between two numbers as they approach each other (Mover and Landauer 1967, 
Longo and Lourenco 2007).  Thus, in a visual representation of uncertainty, as the difference 
between two alternatives’ probabilities of meeting the target increases, it becomes easier to 
perceive this difference and identify the alternative with a higher probability of meeting the 
target. Assuming the participants recognize the optimal strategy, the participants’ decisions 
should become more consistent with normative predictions as it becomes easier to identify the 
larger probability.  
 Hypothesis 3: When uncertainty is presented visually, lottery-based decisions are more 
predictable when the difference in variance between the two alternatives is greater. 
 The normative predictions for decisions with outcome-based incentives are based on 
stochastic dominance relationships.  The questions with a visual representation of uncertainty all 
exhibit second order stochastic dominance, i.e. the two alternatives have the same mean but 
different variances. The risk-averse decision maker should prefer the alternative with the lower 
variance. Figure 6.1 illustrates how the certain decreases as a function of the variance of the 
decision alternative when the outcomes follow a Gaussian distribution and the decision maker 
has constant risk aversion. Thus, as the variance increases, the difference in certain equivalent or  
76 
 
 
Figure 6.1  Increases in variance lead to reductions in the certain equivalent for the risk-
averse decision maker.   
 
value between the two alternatives increases. This hypothesis follows the same reasoning as 
hypothesis 2 in that as the difference between the two alternatives increases, this difference 
should be easier to perceive by the decision maker, leading to choices more consistent with 
predictions. 
 Hypothesis 4: When uncertainty is represented as a set of prior outcomes, and when a 
target-based incentive is present, decisions are based on the number of samples above 
the target regardless of sample mean or variance.  
 Probability is often taught in terms of a frequentist approach in which probability is 
defined as the fraction of times a given outcome is observed over the long run. Following this 
definition, a simple heuristic for determining which of two sets of outcomes has a greater 
probability of meeting a target is to count the number of observations that meet the target. This 
approach neglects to consider the overall properties of the set such as sample mean and variance.  
6.3.   Experimental Methods 
The experiment is designed to test the hypotheses by comparing participants’ decision 
making with two types of incentives and by comparing decision making with two different 
representations of uncertainty.   
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6.3.1 Subjects and Recruitment 
The experimental subjects consist of 19 students at the University of Illinois with an 
average age of 20.7 years old. All subjects are majoring in a STEM field, have completed at least 
a 200-level university probability or statistics course, and are at least 18 years old.  Subjects were 
recruited via email for a study about peoples’ preferences for uncertain deals. They were told the 
survey would last about 45 minutes and that they would be paid a guaranteed $15 with the 
possibility of additional bonus payment. The full text of the recruitment email may be found in 
Appendix B.1.  
6.3.2 Format and Procedures 
The experiment was conducted in groups of 3-5 students at a time in a conference room 
on the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign campus. The experiment was administered 
using a paper-based survey in which subjects circled their answers or wrote in the blank, 
depending on the question type.  
The survey consisted of four parts: (i) an introduction with warm-up questions, (ii) a 
section of 19 questions that asked about preference for one of two uncertain deals in which 
uncertainty was represented visually, (iii) a section of 16 questions that asked about preference 
for one of two uncertain deals in which uncertainty was represented by sample sets, and (iv) a 
section of 5 comprehension and demographic questions. The warm-up questions related to risk 
aversion while the questions in sections (ii) and (iii) consisted of a choice between two uncertain 
deals. The questions with uncertain deals had one of two payment types. Payment would either 
be equal to the outcome of the uncertain deal (i.e. lottery based or outcome based), or the deals 
were presented with a target and payment equaled $10 if the next outcome was equal to or 
greater than the target. The instructions and experimental measures used in each part of the 
experiment are included in Appendices B.2-B.5.  
All preference questions consist of two alternatives that demonstrate some form of 
stochastic dominance.  In the second part of the experiment, all the pairs of uncertain deals 
exhibit second order stochastic dominance. Thus, the two decision alternatives have the same 
mean but different variances. In the third part of the experiment, some of the questions exhibit 
second order stochastic dominance and some exhibit first order stochastic dominance, i.e. the 
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dominating alternative has a higher mean and lower variance than the dominated alternative. For 
the outcome based incentives, normative and descriptive models of decision making both predict 
the decision maker will select the dominating alternative. For the target based incentive, the 
decision maker should select the alternative with the greater probability of meeting or exceeding 
the target.  
The possible outcomes for all questions are greater than 0. The positive domain is used to 
avoid loss effects that may confound the comparison of incentive types and data representations.  
The compensation for participation included a guaranteed $15 as well as a random lottery 
component. Subjects were told that following the experiment, one of the questions would be 
selected to play for real. After a subject finished all questions and turned in the survey, the 
subject was asked to flip a coin. The coin toss determined which of two preselected questions 
would be played for real. An interactive worksheet had been created in Excel based on random 
number generation to give distributions equivalent to those displayed in the experiment. The 
participant was asked to push the button to simulate an outcome based on the deal chosen during 
the experiment, and the participant received bonus pay according to the outcome and incentive 
type for that question.  
6.3.3 Participant Risk Aversion  
The first part of the experiment consisted of warm-up questions were formatted to 
estimate the participant’s risk aversion and consisted of three questions following formats used 
in the literature (Howard 1988).  
The first question asks the participant if s/he would accept a deal in which there is a 
50/50 chance of winning $10 or losing $5. This question is relatively simple compared to the 
next two questions which ask about indifference points.  
The second question asks the participant to determine the dollar value for which s/he 
would be just indifferent to accepting or rejecting a deal in which there is a 50/50 chance of 
winning that amount or losing one-half of that amount. “Just indifferent” is defined to the 
participants as the point at which s/he is neither happy nor unhappy with the deal and feels the 
same about taking the deal or walking away from it.   
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A third question asks the participant to specify the largest dollar amount s/he is willing to 
pay for a deal with a 70/30 chance of winning $500 or $0.  
The first two questions in this assessment provide a simple consistency check. Either the 
second of the third question can be used to estimate risk aversion independently. However, given 
prior experience in which students give relatively small numbers for the second question, the 
third question is designed to force participants to answer about their risk aversion over a larger 
domain. The risk aversion can be approximated from the responses to both the second and third 
question.  
6.3.4 The Two Incentive Types 
An important component of the experimental design is the presence of two different 
payment types, a lottery or outcome based payment and a target based payment. With the 
outcome based payment, the bonus payment is equal to the outcome of the uncertain deal. With 
the target based payment, the payment equals $10 if the next outcome is equal to or greater than 
the target.  
For the questions with a visual representation of uncertainty, the descriptions of each of 
these that were provided to the participants are as follows: 
Type 1. Outcome Based: Payment equals the outcome of a spin of the wheel you pick.  
Type 2. Target Based: Payment is $10 if the outcome of a spin of the wheel you pick is equal to 
or greater than a target. 
In each question, a highlighted box between the two alternatives specified the type of incentive. 
For the target-based questions, the magnitude of the target is given in this highlighted box. 
 For the questions with a sample set representation of uncertainty, the descriptions 
provided to the participants are as follows: 
Type 1. Outcome Based: Payment equals the next outcome from the chosen alternative.  
Type 2. Target Based: Payment is $10 if the next outcome from the chosen alternative is equal to 
or greater than a target value.  
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These definitions of the incentive types were also provided above each question on the survey. 
For the remainder of this chapter, the incentives are referred to as either “target based” or 
“outcome based,” following these definitions. 
6.3.5 Setting the Target 
The target used in each target-based question was set prior to the start of the experiment. 
The value of the target is communicated in the highlighted box that specifies the type of 
incentive as shown in Figure 6.2.   
The values of the targets are designed such that Hypothesis 2 may be tested. Targets are 
set such that the differences between the two alternatives’ probabilities of meeting the target are 
0.01, 0.03, 0.06, 0.07, 0.08, 0.11, 0.12, 0.18, and 0.20. This set of differences in probability 
enables the analysis of whether the rate of normative responses increases as the difference in 
probability of meeting the target increases.  
The pairs of alternatives used to test the effects of target-based decision making are the 
same pairs of alternatives used to test outcome or non-target based decisions. The alternatives 
must therefore also exhibit a variety of differences in variance to test Hypothesis 3. 
6.3.6 Visual Representation of Uncertainty 
The second part of the experiment asks the participant to indicate which of two uncertain 
deals s/he prefers if the payment for that question is based on a specified type of incentive. In 
these questions, the uncertainty is represented visually in the form of wheels or pie charts. The 
participants are told that the likelihood of an outcome occurring is proportional to its size on the 
wheel.  
For questions with outcome based incentives, the participant is asked to select either 
Wheel A or Wheel B. For questions target based incentives, the participant is asked to select 
Wheel A, Wheel B, or indicate indifference. If the participant indicates indifference, a coin toss 
will be used to select Wheel A or B if this is the question that determines bonus payment at the 
end of the experiment. Figure 6.2 illustrates two of these questions for the two incentive types. 
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Figure 6.2 Two binary questions with visual representations of uncertainty.  
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In the visual representation, the probability of an outcome is proportional to its size on 
the wheel, but the precise size of each outcome is not given. The participant must estimate the 
probability. A format that requires the decision maker to use his/her judgment is specifically 
used for the reason that, outside of the laboratory, the decision maker’s judgment is required to 
estimate uncertainties. In addition, the wheels used in the questions include 5 or 6 possible 
outcomes to parallel the existence of several possibilities that occurs in decisions outside the 
laboratory. Visual representations are associated with higher rates of consistency with normative 
decision predictions than verbal representations (Keller 1985). 
6.3.7 Sample Set Representation of Uncertainty 
The third part of the experiment again asks the participant to indicate which of two 
uncertain deals s/he prefers if the payment for that question is based on the specified incentive 
type. In these questions, the uncertainty is represented in terms of prior outcomes from two 
different sources.  Ten prior outcomes for each alternative are shown. Four pairs of alternatives 
are shown to the participant. For each pair, the participant is asked which s/he prefers if the 
payment is outcome based and which s/he prefers for three different targets in a target-based 
incentive. In two of the pairs of alternatives, the sample set of one alternative has a higher mean 
and lower variance than the set of the other alternative. In the other two pairs of alternatives, the 
sample sets have the same average value but different sample variances. Figure 6.3 shows an 
illustrative example of the information presented to the participant in these questions.  
The sample set representation of uncertainty is intended to replicate experiential learning 
that occurs in practice when beliefs about a probability distribution are based on historical 
outcomes. Similar representations have been used in the literature. For example, Levy (2008) 
describes a decision task in which each alternative is represented by a set of ten possible 
outcomes. 
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 PRIOR OUTCOMES 
   
Figure 6.3  The sample set representation shows ten prior outcomes to represent the 
uncertainty for each of two alternatives.  
 
6.4.   Results  
In the first part of the experiment in which uncertainty is represented visually, an overall 
51.88% of the outcome based decisions are consistent with normative predictions and 70.72% of 
the target based decisions are consistent with normative predictions. In the second part of the 
experiment in which uncertainty is represented by sample set data, an overall 82.24% of the 
decisions follow normative predictions. Of these questions, when one of the alternatives has a 
higher sample mean and lower sample variance, 97.37% of decisions follow normative 
predictions. When the alternatives have the same sample mean and different variances, 67.11% 
of the decisions follow normative predictions. For the target based questions with sample set 
data, an overall 67.76% of decisions follow normative predictions.  
These numbers do not tell the whole story, however. As will be seen through the 
hypotheses tests, the results are sensitive to underlying properties of the decision alternatives 
themselves. Much of the statistical analysis presented in this section has been conducted using R 
software (R Core Team 2014).   
Choice A 
11.32 
7.38 
9.31 
12.67 
11.54 
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6.96 
11.99 
7.89 
8.98 
Choice B 
9.53 
4.82 
9.92 
10.04 
9.54 
9.89 
5.33 
9.99 
5.71 
7.55 
84 
 
6.4.1 Hypothesis 1: Target vs. Outcome Based Decisions 
Target-based decisions follow normative predictions more closely that outcome-
based decisions when uncertainty is represented visually. 
 This hypothesis is tested by comparing the percentage of target-based decisions that 
follow normative predictions to the percentage of outcome-based decisions that follow normative 
predictions. The null and alternative hypotheses are 
0 :
:
T U
a T U
H
H
 
 


 
where T  is the mean number of target-based decisions that follow normative predictions, and 
U  is the mean number of outcome based decisions that follow predictions. 
To test this hypothesis, a within subjects t-test is used using data from the visual 
representation of uncertainty is used. Target-based questions in which the sections of the wheel 
were ordered, leaving no uncertainty about the probability of attaining the target, are omitted. 
Target-based questions in which the difference between the two alternatives in probability of 
attaining the target is greater than 18% are also omitted. For consistency, only outcome-based 
questions with pairs of alternatives identical to those used in the target-based questions are used. 
Because a given pair of decision alternatives is used to test more than one target level, more data 
exists for the target-based questions (n=8 per subject) than for the outcome-based questions (n=3 
per subject). 
Each survey question meeting the inclusion criteria is an observation of a binomial 
variable that can be classified as either following normative predictions (x=1) or not (x=0). For 
each subject, the percentage of responses that follow normative predictions is calculated for each 
treatment and presented in Table 6.1. The sample averages are 0.544 for outcome-based 
questions and 0.707 for target-based questions. Following the Central Limit Theorem, the 
random variable represented as the proportion of observed “successes” from the binomial 
distribution, can be approximated by a normal distribution if min(np, n(1-p))>5. Because n(1-p) 
is 26 for the outcome-based questions and is 44.5 for the target-based questions, the distribution 
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can be represented by the normal distribution, and the use of the standard within-subjects t-test is 
justified.  
The calculated test statistic is 2.361t  . The one-tailed 
crit
t  for 18 degrees of freedom and 
5    is 1.734, indicating the results are statistically significant. The results remain 
significant at the     level ( 2.101
crit
t  ) but not at the 1    level ( 2.552
crit
t  ). The 
null hypothesis is rejected for    . The data supports the hypothesis that target-based 
incentives result in more predictable decisions than outcome-based incentives for uncertainty 
that has a visual representation. 
 
Table 6.1  The percentage of responses that follow normative predictions. 
Subject 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Outcome 0.333 0.667 1.000 1.000 0.333 0.667 0.667 0.667 0.333 0.333 
Target 0.750 0.625 0.813 0.750 0.625 0.438 0.688 0.750 0.875 0.750 
 
Subject 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
Outcome 0.333 1.000 0.667 0.333 0.000 0.667 0.333 0.333 0.667 
Target 0.625 0.625 0.875 0.688 0.750 0.875 0.500 0.813 0.625 
 
 
6.4.2 Hypothesis 2: The Difference in Probability for Target Based Decisions 
When uncertainty is represented visually, target-based decisions are more 
predictable when the difference between the alternatives’ probabilities of 
attaining the target is greater. 
Hypothesis 2 is tested using regression analysis comparing the percentage of normative 
decisions across all subjects for a given question to the difference in probability of meeting the 
target between the two alternatives for that question.  These values are presented in Table 6.2.  
The data are presented in order of increasing difference in probability of meeting the target, but 
the questions were not presented in this order to the subjects.  A preliminary linear regression is 
performed on the data followed by a generalized linear regression.  
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A preliminary linear regression of the data is shown in Figure 6.4. This simple model 
provides initial support for the hypothesis with a p-value of 0.027. 
A generalized linear regression is used to verify the initial findings. Generalized linear 
models provide flexibility in modeling data by relating the linear model to the response variable 
using a link function (Nelder and Wedderburn 1972).  Generalized linear models with binomial 
errors are often used for proportional data because they allow for the bounded nature of 
proportions and have variance that is at a minimum when the dependent variable is 0 or 1 
(Crawley 2007). The results of such a regression on the data are shown in Figure 6.5. The results 
have a significant z-value. The ratio of overdispersion to degrees of freedom is 1.44. While this 
overdispersion ratio is greater than 1, indicating not all the variance is accounted for in the 
model, it is within the 1 to 3 range that is considered typical (Anderson et al. 1994).  
 
Table 6.2 The percentage of normative responses calculated across all subjects.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
( ) P X T  % Normative 
0.01 0.316 
0.03 0.632 
0.06 0.763 
0.07 0.763 
0.08 0.737 
0.11 0.605 
0.12 0.921 
0.18 0.921 
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Figure 6.4 The linear regression provides initial support for Hypothesis 2. 
 
 
Figure 6.5 A generalized linear regression provides support for Hypothesis 2. 
 
Table 6.3 Statistics of the fitted model relating target-based decisions to ( )P X T  . 
 
 
 
 
 
y = 2.7706x + 0.4787 
F-statistic: 8.39 on 1 and 6 degrees of freedom 
p-value: 0.02746 
 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
P
er
ce
n
t 
N
o
rm
at
iv
e 
Difference in Probability 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
P
er
ce
n
t 
N
o
rm
at
iv
e 
Difference in Probability 
Coefficient 
Estimate 
St. Error Z Value P(>|Z|) 
12.766 2.296 5.56 2.69E-08 
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6.4.3 Hypothesis 3: The Difference in Variance for Outcome Based Decisions 
When uncertainty is presented visually, lottery-based decisions are more 
predictable when the difference in variance between the two alternatives is 
greater. 
 Hypothesis 3 is tested using regression analysis comparing the percentage of normative 
decisions across all subjects for a given question to the difference in variance between the two 
alternatives for that question.  These values are presented in Table 6.4.  A preliminary linear 
regression does not support the hypothesis.   
 
Table 6.4 The percentage of normative responses calculated across all subjects.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.6  The data do not support the original statement of hypothesis 3. 
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As a further examination of the rationale behind hypothesis 3, it is interesting to consider 
whether a difference in expected utility, a measure that depends on both risk attitude and the 
variance, is correlated with higher rates of normative decisions. To examine this, the risk 
attitudes estimated in the first part of the experiment are used. It is emphasized that these are 
estimates of risk attitude and are not without error. To minimize error, the data from three 
subjects is omitted from this analysis. One of these subjects left one of the risk assessment 
questions blank while the other two gave inconsistent answers on the consistency check question. 
It is assumed that the participants have a constant risk aversion over the domain of outcomes 
considered. The third risk aversion question (a lottery with outcomes $500 and $0) is designed to 
ensure consideration of participant risk attitude over a domain consistent with the experimental 
questions.  Further, because the domain includes only positive outcomes, risk seeking behavior 
induced by loss aversion is avoided. The assumption of constant risk aversion means that the 
exponential utility function may be used to estimate a participant’s expected utility for a given 
decision alternative.  
Due to the variation in risk aversion across the subjects, the difference between expected 
utility for a given pair of decision alternatives is unique to each subject.  Calculating the fraction 
of responses consistent with normative predictions requires aggregating the 112 responses shown 
in Figure 6.7 into groups with a similar difference in expected utility, making the results 
sensitive to how the data is aggregated.  First, the data is aggregated manually by grouping sets 
of points with similar expected utility values; these results are presented in Figure 6.8 and Table 
6.5.  Next, a naïve aggregation is done with n data points in each group and the final group 
containing any remaining points when 112 is not evenly divisible by n. The regression results 
from these aggregations are presented in Table 6.6.   
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Figure 6.7 A scatter plot of the difference in expected utility for all included questions, 
sorted by magnitude. 
 
 
Figure 6.8 The aggregated data points and fitted model.  
 
Table 6.5 The statistics for the fitted model. 
Coefficient 
Estimate 
St. Error Z Value P(>|Z|) 
Null 
Deviance 
Degrees 
Freedom 
Residual 
Deviance 
Degrees 
Freedom 
26.32 11.90 2.212 0.027 10.3309 8 4.3937 7 
 
 
The results support an alternative hypothesis that lottery-based decisions follow 
normative predictions more closely as the difference in expected utility between the alternatives 
increases.  The logistic model for the manually aggregated data has a p-value of 0.0164. For the 
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naïve groupings, the highest p-values are observed for group sizes of 2, 3, and 4 (p-value of 
0.0514, 0.051, and 0.0504). For data aggregated in groups of 5 and larger, all p-values are less 
than 0.05. Further, the ratio of residual deviance to degrees of freedom is less than 1 for all 
groupings of 4 and larger indicating the fit model accounts well for the observed variance.  
The statistical significance of these results could be confounded, however, if the subjects 
with lower risk aversions also tended to have more decisions that follow normative predictions. 
A linear correlation is therefore performed to assess the relationship between risk aversion and 
the percentage of normative decisions. The regression is shown in Figure 6.9. The p-value of 
0.2549 indicates there is not a statistically significant relationship between the variables. 
 
Table 6.6 The statistics for regressions on data aggregated by n points per group. 
Points/ 
Group 
Coeff. 
Est. 
St. Error Z Value P(>|Z|) 
Null 
Deviance 
Degrees 
Freedom 
Residual 
Deviance 
Degrees 
Freedom 
2 22.75 11.68 1.948 0.0514 88.723 56 83.899 55 
3 22.80 11.68 1.951 0.0510 47.651 37 42.826 36 
4 22.92 11.71 1.957 0.0504 29.927 28 25.075 27 
5 24.66 11.95 2.064 0.0390 19.285 23 13.839 22 
6 24.81 12.11 2.049 0.0405 21.718 19 16.251 18 
7 22.74 11.49 1.979 0.0479 10.8524 16 6.0581 15 
8 24.63 11.77 2.092 0.0364 14.5077 14 9.0884 13 
9 24.72 12.11 2.042 0.0412 11.676 13 6.2634 12 
10 28.19 12.52 2.251 0.0244 14.1416 12 7.5575 11 
11 28.02 12.48 2.245 0.0248 10.4847 11 3.9787 10 
12 23.64 11.92 1.984 0.0473 9.6031 10 4.5883 9 
13 24.64 11.82 2.085 0.0370 7.8517 9 2.4723 8 
14 27.13 11.98 2.264 0.0236 8.3245 8 2.1416 7 
15 22.87 11.6 1.972 0.0486 9.6805 8 4.9133 7 
16 26.31 11.84 2.222 0.0263 9.2992 7 3.5071 6 
17 27.70 12.28 2.255 0.0242 9.0261 7 2.6224 6 
18 26.46 12.61 2.099 0.0359 9.1684 7 3.3442 6 
19 25.58 11.75 2.177 0.0295 6.1261 6 0.65512 5 
20 24.81 11.73 2.115 0.0344 7.4366 6 2.1119 5 
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Figure 6.9 The relationship between risk aversion and normative decision making is not 
statistically significant. 
 
 
 
6.4.4 Hypothesis 4: Sample Set Data and Frequentist Heuristics 
When uncertainty is represented as a set of prior outcomes, and when a target-
based incentive is present, decisions are based on the number of samples above 
the target regardless of sample mean or variance.  
If participant behavior is consistent with the frequentist approach predicted by hypothesis 
4, then the following trends will be observed. Let “normative prediction” refer to the alternative 
that is preferable based on a cumulative distribution of meeting the target constructed from the 
sample data. Let “frequentist prediction” refer to the alternative with a larger number of samples 
greater than the target. If the normative prediction and frequentist prediction are the same for a 
given question, then no difference will be observed in the data. If, however, the normative 
prediction and frequentist prediction contradict, then the difference in rates of behavior is 
indicative of which approach the subjects are using to make their selections.  
In the set of questions, five questions are consistent between normative and frequentist 
predictions. Two questions are constructed to have contradictory predictions. Five questions 
result in indeterminate frequentist predictions because the two alternatives have the same number 
of samples above the target.  
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For the questions with contradictory predictions, 28.95% of responses were consistent 
with normative predictions while 71.05% of responses were consistent with frequentist 
predictions. Note that both questions involved alternatives in which the frequentist approach 
leads to the selection of the alternative with the smaller sample mean and higher sample 
variance. These results support the hypothesis that target based decisions with uncertainty 
represented by a sample set lead to selection based on the alternative with more samples above 
the target. Further, in 28 out of the 38 instances, the participant selected the higher mean 
alternative when the payment was outcome based but switched to the lower mean alternative for 
the target in question.  
6.4.5 Visual vs. Sample Set Representations for Outcome Based Questions 
It is enlightening to compare the outcome based decision making in the case of visual 
representation of uncertainty to the sample set representation of uncertainty. The difference in 
expected utility between the two alternatives in each question is estimated using a Gaussian 
distribution with mean and variance equal to the sample mean and sample variance to represent 
the uncertainty of each alternative. The differences between the cumulative distributions 
constructed from the sample set and these Gaussian approximations are shown in Figure 6.10.  
The difference in expected utility is averaged across the 16 participants (those who 
passed the consistency test on the risk aversion assessment) for each pair of alternatives. 
Although the number of data points is too small to report the p-values of a regression with a high 
degree of confidence, a regression is performed to illustrate the observed upward trend in the 
data as the difference between the alternatives’ expected utility increases.  The results of a 
generalized regression are shown in Figure 6.11 with the relevant statistics shown in Table 6.7. 
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Figure 6.10 The uncertainty in each sample set is approximated with a Gaussian distribution. 
 
 
Figure 6.11 A generalized linear regression with binomial errors from the sample set 
questions. 
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Table 6.7 The statistics of the regression for the sample set, outcome based questions. 
Coefficient 
Estimate 
St. Error Z Value P(>|Z|) 
Null 
Deviance 
Degrees 
Freedom 
Residual 
Deviance 
Degrees 
Freedom 
133.5 29.67 4.498 6.86E-06 51.84 4 1.787 3 
 
 
 
Figure 6.12 The normative response rates for the sample set questions show no relation to 
participant risk aversion.  
 
It is also shown in Figure 6.12 that no statistically significant relationship exists between 
a participant’s risk aversion and the propensity to follow normative predictions.  
The trend observed in the questions with a sample set representation of uncertainty is 
consistent with the trend observed in questions with a visual representation of uncertainty. 
Although the way in which uncertainty is presented is expected to affect whether decisions 
follow normative predictions, it is interesting to compare the two trends. Figure 6.13 illustrates 
the data for both types of questions along with a regression curve. Table 6.8 provides the details 
of the regression.  
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Figure 6.13 A similar trend is observed in outcome based questions for both representations of 
uncertainty. 
 
Table 6.8 The statistics of the regression for outcome based questions of both types. 
Coefficient 
Estimate 
St. Error Z Value P(>|Z|) 
Null 
Deviance 
Degrees 
Freedom 
Residual 
Deviance 
Degrees 
Freedom 
57.55 12.55 4.584 4.55-06 51.963 12 18.596 11 
 
 
6.5.   Discussion 
The results from the experiment show several important insights about both the use of 
target-based incentives as well as models of descriptive decision making in general. The simple 
model of the processes involved in making a decision shown in Figure 6.14 is helpful in 
explaining some of the experimental results. 
 
 
Figure 6.14 A simple representation of the processes involved in decision making 
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The predictability of target-based decision making is determined by properties of the 
decision alternatives themselves. The role of information processing is emphasized by 
differences between the observed results with a visual display of uncertainty and the results with 
a sample set representation of uncertainty. With a fixed target, the optimal strategy is to 
maximize the probability of attaining the target, a strategy that the results suggest decision 
makers readily perceive. The presence of a target effectively homogenizes the preferences of the 
decision makers. 
The predictability of outcome-based decision making, on the other hand, cannot be well 
predicted without knowing information about the decision alternatives as well as information 
about the preferences of the decision maker for outcomes under uncertainty. The properties of 
the decision alternatives (difference in variance) have no predictive power of decisions made by 
the participants. However, when the expected utility is calculated for each alternative, the 
difference between the expected utility of the two decision alternatives is a statistically 
significant predictor of the rate of normative decision making.  
An important difference between target-based decision making and outcome-based 
decision making is the different information that is needed to be able to predict rates of 
normative behavior. Both approaches require information about the decision alternatives. 
Outcome-based requires additional information about risk attitude. For an organization deciding 
whether to implement target-based or outcome-based incentives, the role of risk aversion is 
important to consider. If the organization has no information about its employees’ risk attitudes, 
it is at a disadvantage when determining outcome-based incentives. This disadvantage is 
immaterial, however, if a target-based incentive is implemented.    
The experimental results on outcome-based decisions are consistent with a bounded 
rationality view of decision making in which deviations from normative predictions are due to 
limitation in the ability to perceive and calculate information (Simon 1955).  None of the 
questions resulted in rates significantly lower than half normative responses.  This 50% mark is 
important because in the case of perfectly identical decision alternatives, random selection 
between the two would result in an approximately even split. Similarly, if the decision maker’s 
expected utility for one alternative is very close to the other alternative, the decision maker may 
not be able to perceive the difference and response rates will be close to an even split. As the 
98 
 
difference in expected utility increases, it becomes easier to discern the alternative with the 
higher expected utility, and the rate of normative responses increases. This trend is precisely 
what is observed in the data.  These results are also consistent with the bounded rationality 
explanation of an earlier experiment of first order dominance violations (Levy 2008). 
The results presented in this experiment bring into question experiments that report 
violations of normative decision making without attempting to account for individual differences 
in preference and risk attitude. The overall rate of normative responses for questions with a 
visual representation of uncertainty is only 51.88%. This rate is not statistically different from a 
coin toss in predicting normative behavior.  As this chapter illustrates, however, this number 
does not tell the whole story. Experiments that do not estimate individual differences in 
preferences and risk attitudes are unable to reject a bounded rationality explanation of violations 
of expected utility theory.  
In addition to identifying a bounded rationality trend, this experiment characterizes the 
relationship. This characterization is important because it may be used to identify when 
normative models provide adequate predictions of behavior and when they do not. The use of 
bounded rationality to explain the observed results does not invalidate the descriptive ability of 
other models of descriptive decision making. Rather, the relationship characterized in this paper 
explains when these models may be most useful as illustrated in Figure 6.15.  
 
 
Figure 6.15 The rate of normative decision making may be used to guide model selection. 
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An interesting question to consider is how well the bounded rationality model explains 
decision making behavior reported in experiments designed around utility theory violations other 
than stochastic dominance. For example, the Allais paradox (Allais 1963) is a well-known 
example of a pair of binary decisions that tend to violate normative predictions that has been 
reformulated and reexamined many times in the literature (Slovic and Tversky 1974, Kahneman 
and Tversky 1979). Consider the formulation presented by Prelec (1990): 
 Decision 1: 
 Alternative A. 2% chance of $20,000. 98% chance of $0. 
 Alternative B. 1% chance of $30,000. 99% chance of $0. 
 Decision 2: 
 Alternative C. 34% chance of $20,000. 66% chance of $0. 
 Alternative D. 1% chance of $30,000. 32% chance of $20,000. 67% chance of $0.  
Following the tenets of utility theory, a risk averse decision maker prefers A and C while a risk 
seeking decision maker prefers B and D. Further, the expected utility of A is the same as that of 
C, and the expected utility of B is the same as that of D. Yet, when shown these decisions one 
after the other, about half of respondents choose A then D. The proportion of respondents 
reported to select each combination of alternatives is shown in Figure 6.16.  
 
 
Figure 6.16 Results of an experiment that mimics the Allais paradox (Prelec 1990). 
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Initially, the results may not appear to support a bounded rationality view of utility 
theory. The author of this particular study uses prospect theory to explain the deviations. Note, 
however, that the descriptive models which focus on deviations from utility theory do not 
provide explanations for the observed rates of normative behavior. Further, the alternatives in 
this example are quite similar in terms of expected value and are therefore likely to be quite 
similar in terms of expected utility, leading to a prediction of approximately 50% normative 
decisions based on bounded rationality.  The fraction of total participants selecting A and C is 
not significantly different from the bounded rationality prediction of 2(0.5) 0.25 .  It is possible 
that a model of bounded rationality may be used to explain rates of overall normative behavior 
while asymmetries in the errors of judgment result in the observed trends in non-normative 
decisions. This view provides a holistic perspective of normative and descriptive decision 
theories.  
This proposed role of bounded rationality is similar to proposed explanations for 
violations of monotonicity.  Luce (1992) argues that some observed violations of monotonicity 
are actually a result of bounded rationality when calculations are required to see the equivalence 
between different representations of uncertainty. 
6.6.   Conclusion 
This chapter presents the design and results of an experiment that compares target-based 
and non-target based decision making.  The results show that rates of normative target-based 
decision making may be predicted using information about the decision alternatives alone. Rates 
of normative outcome-based decision making, on the other hand, cannot be predicted by the 
properties of the decision alternatives alone.  A statistically significant trend in rates of 
normative decision making is only present when estimates of the decision makers’ risk attitudes 
are included in the results. The trend shows that rates of normative decision making increase as 
the difference in expected utility between the alternatives increases, and these rates approach 
50% as the alternatives become increasingly similar. The results support a model of bounded 
rationality that is characterized using a generalized linear regression.  
These results encourage a fresh look at experiments of decision making behavior that do 
not account for individual differences in preferences when tracking violations of utility theory.  
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7.   REWARDS, PENALTIES, AND MULTIATTRIBUTE TARGETS: 
AN APPLICATION TO HIGH-SPEED MACHINING 
 
7.1.   Introduction 
This chapter considers the effect of incentives in engineering systems. In these contexts, 
optimal parameter selection is crucial to overall system performance. Often, requirements or 
targets are set for the components within the system to ensure proper coordination with all other 
components and to maximize the objective function. Recent work, however, has shown that the 
use of requirements can result in lost value (Hupman et al. 2015). In particular, when multiple 
parameters affect performance collectively, multiattribute performance targets are required, and 
the specification of trade-offs among these targets is necessary to ensure value-maximizing 
decisions (Abbas and Matheson 2009).  Yet such trade-offs have not been implemented in 
practice. This chapter characterizes the use of incentive structures as an alternative to the 
specification of trade-offs among parameters and shows that incentive systems can be aligned 
with system value to support the selection of optimal system parameters. 
Recent work in the management literature examines the alignment of incentives and 
value in decision making (Abbas et al. 2009a). The motivation for examining incentives is the 
loss in value that occurs when incentives are improperly set (Hupman and Abbas 2014). 
Although some work has shown how to set incentives in terms of fixed targets (Abbas and 
Matheson 2005) and variable targets (Bordley and LiCalzi 2000, Castagnoli and LiCalzi 1996), 
related ideas have not been examined in the context of engineering systems. This chapter 
integrates incentive structures and engineering and shows that in some cases, it is possible to 
obtain optimal parameter selection through quite simple incentive structures. 
The effect of different incentive structures on total system value is examined. Rarely do 
engineering systems operate independently of human interaction, and people’s actions and 
decisions are influenced by the incentives they face. If these incentives are poorly constructed, it 
is possible that the actions of people will hinder the performance of the system.  Understanding 
how incentives may affect employee behavior and decisions is of great importance. Even in 
firms that do not offer explicit incentives, implicit incentives arise in a variety of settings (Corts 
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2012, Lazear 1997) motivating the study of whether incentives can be set to ensure optimal 
system performance and value capture.  
To understand the effect of incentives on value, a value function must be specified and a 
value-based optimization is needed to determine the optimal value capture of the system. Next, 
incentive structures are introduced that influence the decisions made by employees.  Multiple 
types of incentive structures are studied.  For each case, the effect on system value is quantified.  
The analysis is formulated in the context of a high-speed machining example.  High-
speed milling involves the selection of numerous manufacturing parameters by the machinist 
who operates the manufacturing equipment and/or the programmer who writes the numerical 
control instructions for the machine tool.  Although software exists to support milling parameter 
selection, the machinist has discretion in the manufacturing process and the ability to affect the 
system in a variety of ways. Thus, the analysis examines how incentives may affect these 
decisions. Any decision support available from software serves to support the use of optimal 
response to the incentive structure in the model. The purpose of this context is to provide a 
simple, but real life engineering example that examines how incentives affect system value. 
Previous work in milling has examined the effect of uncertainties on the milling parameter 
decisions (Abbas et al. 2009b, Schmitz et al. 2011), but the effects of incentives have not yet 
been studied. 
Incentives are examined at the individual employee level.  While the effect of incentives 
on behavior is known to be complex, it is widely acknowledged that they do affect behavior 
(Lock 1968, Maerer and Hogarth 1999).  Incentives can be structured as rewards or penalties. 
Empirical studies show employees generally prefer incentives framed as rewards (Luft 1991, 
Fehr and Schmidt 2007).  A common type of reward based incentive is known as the piece rate 
incentive in which the employee is paid a bonus for each additional unit produced (Lazear 2000).  
Empirical evidence has shown that piece rate incentives can increase productivity (Shearer 
2004). Other work has shown, however, that when information and actions can be hidden, no 
incentive structure can induce optimal behavior (Gibbons 1987). 
The work in this chapter also relates to the literature that describes human system 
interaction (Chang et al. 2008).  The focus is generally on humans as end users of systems and 
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issues such as the usability are considered (Chang and Dillon 2006).  This approach contrasts 
with ours in that we treat the person not as an end user, but rather as an integral component that 
functions within a larger system. This approach to the role of humans within a system’s function 
relates to work on the use of aids for decision making in systems (Ashok and Tesar 2008, 2013).  
 Many of the ideas presented in this chapter are forthcoming in a journal publication 
(Hupman, Abbas and Schmitz 2015). The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. 
Section 7.2 describes the high-speed machining context in which the analysis is completed.  
Section 7.3 presents the analysis and results for a deterministic case while Section 7.4 
incorporates uncertainty in the system. Section 7.5 discusses the results, and Section 7.6 presents 
concluding remarks.  
7.2.   High-Speed Machining in Engineering Systems 
Incentives are examined within a high-speed milling application. High-speed machining 
entails the use milling at very high speeds to systematically and quickly remove metal from a 
base surface or workpiece, thereby producing a product with dimensions significantly different 
from the original piece. In milling, several decision parameters must be determined for a 
particular project (Abbas et al. 2009b).  Due to the large number of decision parameters and their 
complex effects on outcomes, the optimal choice of parameters can be modelled as a system 
design problem with a known value function.   
The decision variables in milling can be categorized into three groups: tool parameters, 
holder/machine parameters, and milling parameters.  The tool parameters describe technical 
aspects of the tool, such as its material/coating, geometry, diameter, and number of teeth.  The 
holder/machine parameters describe the holder material, geometry, and the tool insertion length 
into the holder, as well as the machine and spindle into which the holder-tool will be clamped.  
Milling parameters include the rotating speed of the spindle and the axial depth of cut that 
determines how much material is removed in a given cut. These parameters are illustrated in 
Figure 7.1. Higher spindle speeds and deeper cuts reduce milling time, but they also reduce the 
usable life of the milling tool. Additional parameters including the radial depth of cut and feed 
per tooth are treated as fixed parameters in the analysis. 
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Figure 7.1. The axial depth of cut cut (b) is the specified depth of cut along the tool axis. 
Spindle speed (Ω) is measured in rotations per unit time. 
 
The properties of the tool and holder/machine determine the process dynamics, which 
affect the cutting forces and tool vibration. The process dynamics are treated as deterministic in 
Section 7.3 while uncertainty is incorporated in Section 7.4. These dynamics determine the 
stability of the milling system.  An unstable system means that self-excited vibrations or chatter 
is present resulting in the production of a low quality product that is either worthless to the 
manufacturer or requires significant rework to make it acceptable.  Thus, the process dynamics 
determine the boundary that identifies the maximum axial depth of cut for which the process is 
stable at the specified spindle speed.  
The milling parameters subsequently affect the cost of milling.  The axial depth of cut 
partially defines the tool path which affects the time to complete a task. Both the depth of cut and 
the spindle speed influence the tool life.  The relationship of the decision parameters to profit is 
illustrated in Figure 7.2 where double ovals represent deterministic calculations, rectangles 
represent decisions, and the hexagon is a value node.  
Because different materials have different properties, it is important to specify the type of 
tool and workpiece. The analysis considers a single choice of tool and workpiece material, a 
TiAlN-coated, tungsten carbide endmill (10 mm diameter d, 4 teeth) that is used to machine 
SKD61 steel.  The milling task consists of machining away a cube of steel with an edge length of 
100 mm. The tool path required for this milling task is used to determine the total time spent 
cutting the cube of material, tc, as well as the total time to machine the cube, tm. The cutting time 
is less than the total time to machine the cube due to time needed to reposition the tool between 
cuts. For the specified geometry, these times are given by the following equations, 
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Figure 7.2. The relationship between decision parameters and profit.  
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where d is the tool diameter, W is the length of the cube edge,  N is the number of teeth, ft is the 
feed per tooth, and a is the radial depth of cut.  The feed per tooth is the distance traveled by the 
tool along the direction of the cut between tooth engagements where the tool teeth are illustrated 
by the spikes on the right side of Figure 7.1. The radial depth of cut is limited by the tool 
diameter and describes the portion of the tool diameter engaged in the cut. This analysis is 
simplified to illustrate the effect of incentives and therefore treats the feed per tooth and radial 
depth of cut as fixed parameters with values of 0.15 mm and 3.0 mm, respectively.  
Both the tool selection and the milling parameters affect the tool life.  A Taylor-type tool 
life equation is used to determine tool life, where the constants are determined by the tool choice 
and workpiece material (Abbas et al. 2009b, Taylor 1907, Tsai et al. 2005). The tool life T, or the 
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time required to reach a predetermined wear level on the cutting edge, for the case used in this 
paper is given by 
 
1.6265
6 0.28372.3741 10 .
1000
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T b

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   (7.3) 
The cost for milling the product, Cm, is calculated as 
 ( ) cm m m ch m t
t
C t r t r C
T
    (7.4) 
where rm is the cost per minute for milling, tch is the time in minutes to change a worn tool, and 
Ct is the cost per tool.  In this example, rm is $1/min, tch is 0.07 min, and Ct is $114. 
The objective of a for-profit engineering firm is to maximize profit, P.  In addition to the 
costs of milling, some fixed costs, Cf, may exist.  Revenue from the product, R, is treated as 
deterministic. This deterministic representation is appropriate for the case in which a client 
specifies the design of the product in advance, and the manufacturing firm produces the product 
on a contract basis.  The objective for the firm is then to maximize P, 
 .m fP R C C    (7.5) 
Fixed costs are omitted from the analysis without affecting the results.  
Finally, the optimization must consider the stability boundary imposed by the process 
dynamics.  The approach for determining the boundaries for both the deterministic and the 
uncertain case is described in the literature and is beyond the scope of this chapter (Schmitz and 
Smith 2009).  The boundary determined for the deterministic numeric example used in the 
analysis is shown in Figure 7.3. The representation of uncertainty in this boundary is presented in 
Section 7.4. 
7.3.   Deterministic Analysis and Results 
The central motivation for this analysis is the possibility that incentives can affect the 
overall system value to a firm. In the case that incentives induce behavior or decisions that 
negatively impact profit, we define a measure known as the value gap.  Let the optimal profit  
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Figure 7.3. The process dynamics impose a boundary on the stable operating region.  
 
obtainable be denoted P*. The profit obtained with incentive structure i is denoted P
i
.  The value 
gap is then the difference between the best obtainable and what is obtained with the incentive,  
  * .
iValue Gap P P   (7.6) 
A strictly value based approach is an optimization over the profit function.  This 
approach assumes that all employees will operate consistently at the optimal values in the 
absence of any incentive structure.  
For the high-speed milling case, equation 7.4 calculates the cost of milling, Cm, in terms 
of spindle speed, Ω, and axial depth, b. Revenue is assumed constant. Maximizing profit is 
therefore equivalent to minimizing the cost, Cm. The minimization occurs over the domain 
defined by the stability boundary illustrated in Figure 7.3. If milling occurs in the unstable 
region, then vibrations and chatter occur that damage the tool and the product, causing the cost to 
increase. Parameters in the unstable region are therefore not considered. The optimal profit, P*, 
occurs at the point ( ,  3.80,  37100b      with a minimum cost of $38.43 per milled product. 
Figure 7.4 shows the cost as a function of spindle speed where the limiting axial depth is used for 
each spindle speed. The limiting axial depth is the axial depth along the stability boundary.   
The effect of incentives for the machinist on the optimal profit, or minimum machining 
cost, for the firm is examined.  This analysis assumes that employees adhere to the rules of 
normative decision making (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1947), and their decisions are  
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Figure 7.4. The cost as a function of spindle speed where the limiting axial depth is used for 
each spindle speed 
 
influenced by incentives.  Three cases are considered: penalty based incentives, reward based 
incentives, and a hybrid incentive structure. 
7.3.1 Penalty Based Incentives 
The case where the incentive structure is formulated as a penalty is considered first.  A 
possible rationale for a penalty based system is that the firm incurs additional costs for each tool 
that wears out.  Because the rate at which the tool wears out is determined by the milling 
parameters chosen by the machinist, the firm has an interest in influencing the machinist to 
extend the life of the tool.  The payment system is structured as an hourly wage with a penalty 
imposed for each tool that wears out. The machinist’s objective is therefore to maximize the tool 
life, T.  
A trivial solution in this case is for the employee to stop working because this will ensure 
that no tools wear out.  Restrictions must therefore be imposed on the parameters such as a 
minimum cut depth of 0.5 mm and a minimum spindle speed of 20000 rpm. These restrictions 
essentially take the form of multiattribute targets. Figure 7.5 illustrates the relationship between 
these domain restrictions and the tool life.  The independent parameter thresholds create a 
rectangular acceptable region while the measure of interest (tool life in this case) changes 
continuously with each attribute. Points exist outside the acceptable region that would be 
preferred by the machinist, highlighting the fact that multiattribute targets in the absence of 
specified tradeoffs do not produce optimal results (Abbas and Matheson 2009).  
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Figure 7.5. The minimum bounds on parameters create a set of multiattribute targets. 
 
The boundary restrictions imposed in the penalty case are consistent with some form of 
monitoring to ensure the null solution of do nothing is not enacted. Given the specified domains 
of the parameters, the maximum T occurs at ( ,   b     . The cost is $209.72 per unit, 
resulting in a value gap of $171.29.  
The optimal solution for the machinist in the penalty case is to operate at the minimum 
bound set for both axial depth and spindle speed. The bounds or targets specified for the 
parameters determine the parameters that are selected under this incentive. 
7.3.2 Reward Based Incentives 
The case in which the incentives are structured as rewards is considered next.  The 
machinist is paid a bonus for each part that is produced.  In this case the machinist’s objective is 
to minimize the time spent milling the product, tm.  The best values for the machinist are 
( ,  3.79  37100),b      resulting in a cost of $38.43. This cost matches the optimal case and 
results in a value gap of $0. 
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7.3.3 Hybrid Incentive Structure 
A generalized hybrid case is considered next. The machinist receives both a reward for 
each unit produced and penalty for each tool that wears out.  The incentive is formulated as a 
convex combination of reward and penalty, 
 
(1
m
I
t T
  
   (7.7) 
where α is a parameter that governs the amount of reward or penalty and I is the total incentive 
pay to the machinist. The reward is based on the number of units produced.  The penalty is based 
on the number of tools that wear out. I can be positive or negative.  
The machinist’s objective is to maximize I. The value gap as a function of α is a step 
function as shown in Figure 5. The value gap is $171.29 for 0 0.25  , $10.01 for 
0.26 0.34  , and $0 for 5   . These steps are labelled A, B, and C, and the 
corresponding points in the stability diagram are also shown in Figure 7.6. Note that domain 
restrictions of [0.5,  4 ]b mm  and   ]rpm   are imposed which affect the first 
step of the value gap.  
 
 
Figure 7.6. The value gap takes on three different values as the mix of reward and penalty in 
the incentive changes that correspond to points on the stability boundary.  
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The parameter α governs how the machinist values trade-offs between the decision 
variables. The change in trade-offs can be illustrated by plotting the surface contours for 
different values of α as shown in Figure 7.7. When maximizing the hybrid incentive, the 
direction of the maximization with respect to the decision variables changes significantly as the 
parameter α changes; Figure 7.8 underscores this result by showing how the gradient of the 
incentive changes as a function of α at a given point. These changes may be compared to the 
contours of the cost of milling, also shown in Figure 7.7. Although none of the incentive surfaces 
matches the cost surface, because the directions of the gradients are similar and because the 
system has nonlinear boundaries, the result of optimizing over these two difference surfaces is 
the same set of optimal parameters for a wide range of α values. 
 
 
Figure 7.7. The contours of the hybrid incentive illustrate how the parameter α affects the 
machinist’s trade-offs between the variables and the level of congruence between the 
hybrid incentive and the cost of milling. 
 
I: α = 1 Cm 
I: α = 0.5 I: α = 0 
Ω  
(rpm) 
Ω  
(rpm) 
Ω  
(rpm) 
Ω  
(rpm) 
112 
 
 
Figure 7.8. The gradient of the hybrid incentive at the point ( ,  2.50  37500)b      as a 
function of the parameter α. 
 
7.4.   Incorporating Uncertainty 
In practice, not all the relevant parameters are known deterministically; some uncertainty 
is present. This uncertainty may arise from numerous sources including the stability boundaries 
(Abbas et al. 2009b) and the actual tool wear (Karandikar and Kurfess 2015).   
7.4.1. Uncertainty in Stability Boundaries 
In high-speed milling, the process dynamics include the characterization of forces that 
exist between the tool and the work piece.  These forces are described by a cutting force model. 
These forces may be uncertain, leading to uncertainty in the force model coefficients. 
Uncertainty in these coefficients in turn creates uncertainty in the process dynamics constraints. 
We consider the effect of this uncertainty on the value gap induced by incentives. 
Classic probability encoding techniques are used to describe the uncertainty in the force 
model coefficients. The probability distribution is discretized into the 10%, 50%, and 90% 
fractiles of the cumulative distribution. Each fractile has an associated variable: XLow, XBase, and 
XHigh, respectively. The probability mass function assigned to these variables is {0.25, 0.50, 
0.25}. Expert elicitation is used to determine the values for this case study where the elicitation 
follows standard procedures (Abbas et al. 2009b).  
The uncertain force model coefficients are used to calculate the associated stability 
boundaries as presented in Figure 7.9. The hybrid incentive is analyzed again using these 
α 
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boundaries. The stability boundaries are assumed to be uncertain when the manufacturing firm 
sets the incentive, and the machinist observes the actual stability boundary when selecting the 
spindle speed and axial depth.  
The minimum cost for each stability boundary is used to find the value gap for that 
boundary as a function of the incentive parameter α as shown on the left in Figure 7.10. The 
overall expected value gap is a weighted average of these step functions and is shown on the 
right in Figure 7.10. The expected value gap is $0 for 0.37     
 
 
Figure 7.9. Uncertainty in the process dynamics constraints is shown by the low, base, and 
high fractiles. 
 
 
Figure 7.10. The low, base, and high fractiles of the value gap (left) and the overall expected 
value gap (right). 
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7.4.2. Generalized Uncertainty in the System 
Any uncertainty that exists in the system also exists in the incentive structure. Thus, the 
incentive based approach can be used for non-deterministic systems. For example, if the tool life 
is uncertain, then this uncertainty translates to uncertainty over the costs as well as the incentive. 
To analyze the system under conditions of uncertainty, the uncertainty must be translated from a 
distribution over the parameter to a distribution over the objective function. In this case, the 
analysis requires the calculation of the distribution over the cost and the incentive. 
Uncertainty in the tool life illustrates how the inclusion of uncertainty affects the 
analysis. Equation 7.3 is taken to be the midpoint of a uniform distribution. For example, 
suppose there were +/-2% error in the estimation of tool life. The distribution over tool life is 
then represented as a uniform distribution on the range (0.98T, 1.02T) to represent maximum 
entropy within the range. The width of this distribution is varied to determine the sensitivity of 
the results to uncertainty. When comparing the expected value of the objective function to the 
value in the deterministic system, very little variation is observed. For example, Figure 7.11 
shows the difference in contours when the tool life is deterministic (solid lines) and when the 
tool life has +/-20% error. Small differences are observed even in this extreme case of error that 
is well beyond the error that exists in current tool life forecasting methods (Karandikar and 
Kurfess 2014). 
The effect of uncertainty on the optimal hybrid incentive parameter α is examined. When 
uncertainty is included in the analysis, the shape of the resulting value gaps closely match the 
results of the deterministic case from Section 7.3, Figure 7.6. Only as the error in tool life 
becomes drastic do the selected parameters change. Figure 7.12 compares the deterministic case 
to the results of +/-30% error in tool life. Even in this extreme case, the hybrid parameters (α) at 
the point where the optimal milling parameter selections change only have a difference of 0.01. 
This level of error is well beyond what would be expected in practice. 
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Figure 7.11. The inclusion of uncertainty (dashed lines) in parameters results in small shifts 
from the deterministic case (solid lines). 
 
 
Figure 7.12. The difference in value gaps as a function of the hybrid incentive parameter α 
 
7.5.   Discussion  
This chapter analyzes the effect of three incentive structures.  The hybrid incentive 
structure provides insight into the reward and penalty structures because it is a generalized case 
of the two. When 0    the hybrid incentive simplifies to the penalty-only case. When    
the hybrid incentive represents the reward-only case. The results for the hybrid incentive at these 
values of α match the results in the penalty and reward structures.  
0
50
100
150
200
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
V
al
u
e 
G
ap
 (
$
) 
α 
Deterministic System
30% Error in Tool Life
I: α = 0.9 C
m
 
Ω (rpm) Ω (rpm) 
116 
 
In the penalty-only case, the results are sensitive to the minima set for the domains of b 
and Ω.  This sensitivity results from the existence of a trivial optimal solution: do nothing. The 
optimal parameters therefore take on their respective minimum values due to the emphasis on 
tool wear.  
The results of the reward-only and hybrid incentive showed it is possible to obtain a $0 
value gap through incentives.  Given that the reward-only incentive is a special case of the 
hybrid, these results compel careful consideration of the construction of the hybrid incentive. 
This incentive (Equation 7.7) is based on the machining time (tm) and the tool life (T), variables 
that also appear in the cost function (Equation 7.4). Not only do the same variables appear, but 
they affect the two functions in similar ways: increases in tm are detrimental to both while 
increases in T are beneficial to both.  By formulating the hybrid incentive as a convex 
combination of these opposing forces governed by the parameter α, it is possible to effect large 
changes in the gradient of the hybrid incentive simply by changing α.  
The results show a wide range of values for α result in optimal parameter selection. This 
result, however, is sensitive to the active boundary constraints of the system.  In our milling 
example, the process dynamics constraint is the active constraint in the system optimization. The 
optimal parameters occur at a discontinuity in the constraint. Because of this discontinuity, a 
wide range of gradient angles for maximizing the hybrid incentive correspond to the same 
optima as minimizing the cost. This result illustrates that it is possible for simple objective 
functions to result in the same optimal parameter selections as more complex value functions.  
The effect of uncertainty in the system is also examined. Interestingly, similar results are 
obtained for the deterministic and stochastic cases. When considering uncertainty in the process 
dynamics constraints, the reward-only results are unchanged. For a hybrid incentive, the critical 
value of α above which the value gap is $0 increases due to the effects of the different and 
uncertain boundaries. The overall effect of α, however, is consistent with the deterministic case; 
as α increases towards the rewards-only case, the expected value gap decreases. When 
considering uncertainty in tool life, very little change is observed in the behavior of the value 
gap. These results provide evidence supporting the robustness of incentive-based parameter 
selections to the presence of uncertainty. This robustness results due to the same source of 
uncertainty for both the cost function and the incentive function.  
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The results in this chapter show that in some cases, it is possible to communicate values 
and acceptable trade-offs among multiple parameters using simple functions and still obtain 
optimal results. Thus, in systems operating with multiattribute performance requirements, it may 
be possible to use simplified trade-offs among the requirements to facilitate the optimization 
without sacrificing performance. These findings are also important for engineering firms wishing 
to maintain the confidentiality of information while communicating trade-offs to engineers.   
The results of this paper illustrate the importance of understanding the effect of incentive 
structures within the context of systems engineering. Poorly aligned incentive structures may 
cause significant loss of value. In some cases, such as the high-speed milling example we 
analyze, it is possible to create incentives that are both simple and that induce value-maximizing 
behavior. These results underscore the potential for using incentive structures to maximize value 
in engineering firms. 
7.6.   Conclusion 
The literature describes the effect of incentives on effort and motivation on 
manufacturing, most notably through the use of piece-rate incentives. Motivated by the positive 
psychological effects of incentives, this chapter examines the effect of incentive structures in 
manufacturing decisions and parameter selection within engineering systems. A high-speed 
milling example illustrates the approach for three incentive structures: reward based, penalty 
based, and a hybrid structure. The hybrid incentive allows for system optimization over a variety 
of trade-offs among the decision variables as shown by the range of gradient angles obtainable. 
Both the hybrid and the reward based incentives induce value maximizing decisions and that 
these results are robust to the inclusion of uncertainty in the system. These findings show that 
values and acceptable trade-offs among variables can be communicated using simple incentive 
functions. This result facilitates the use of normative multiattribute requirements with trade-offs 
and also has the potential benefit of facilitating the maintenance of proprietary value function 
information. These results underscore the importance of understanding the dynamics of the 
system to which incentives are applied.  
This work introduces a new approach to supporting parameter selection in engineering 
systems. Based on these results, future work is needed to verify the approach in other 
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engineering systems and to study the possible synergistic effects of incentives that positively 
affect both effort and decision making.  
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8.   IMPLICATIONS, EXTENSIONS, AND FUTURE WORK 
 
8.1.   Summary of Findings 
The work presented in the preceding chapters examines the effects of target-based 
incentive structures as well as some non-target based incentives on decision making. Theoretical 
insights based on modeling and simulation provide insight to how targets should be set. 
Experimental results provide insight to the role of cognitive perceptions of probability and the 
differences between target and non-target based incentives. An application to an engineering 
system is also examined, showing that system dynamics can be leveraged to use simple incentive 
structures to support optimal parameter selection when multiple parameters interact to determine 
performance. Important results are derived from each of these areas as outlined throughout this 
work.  
A summary of the key findings is as follows. 
 Increases in an organization’s risk aversion decrease optimal fixed targets. 
 Increases in the number of available decision alternatives increase the optimal target.  
 When decision alternatives are distributed along an efficient frontier, it is better to set 
a target that is too high than to set one that is too low. 
 Cooperative targets effectively change the distribution of the target with convolutions 
of distributions mimicking the results of an efficient frontier for an individual target. 
 The predictability of target-based decisions depends on the decision maker’s ability to 
perceive the relevant uncertainties. 
 The predictability of outcome-based decisions depends on both the properties of the 
decision alternatives and the risk preferences of the decision maker. 
 In cases with multiattribute targets, simple incentive structures may be able to support 
optimal decision making in the absence of specifying acceptable trade-offs among the 
attributes.  
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It is important, however, to also acknowledge the limitations of the methods used to 
derive these insights. 
 The simulation model presented in Chapter 2 and used in Chapters 3 and 4 makes some 
simplifying assumptions about the context in which decisions are being made. For example, the 
organization is modeled to behave as a single, rational individual. In practice, many large 
organizations are governed by a board of directors which may be subject to various power 
struggles between its members or even power struggles with outside parties. If the governing 
body is consists of individuals with contrasting opinions and preferences, the representation of 
the organization as a single, rational entity may not provide an accurate description of the 
organization’s preferences. In this case, a game theoretic approach may provide additional 
insights. In addition, the model relies on the specification of a probability distribution of future 
decision situations. This is an important area for future work. 
 The behavioral experiments presented in Chapter 6 highlight important contrasts between 
target-based and non-target based decision making. These experiments, however, are limited by 
the mere fact that they are conducted in a laboratory setting. In real life scenarios, decision 
makers must identify their decision alternatives and characterize the relevant uncertainties based 
on whatever information is available to them; they are not presented with a pair of pre-defined 
alternatives. Although the experiment attempts to replicate certain aspects of decision making in 
the real world, for example, by providing representations of uncertainty that require some degree 
of perceptual acuity, a laboratory experiment cannot perfectly replicate all aspects of decision 
making that occurs in practice.  
Finally, the work that applies incentive structures to engineering systems in Chapter 7 is 
exciting because it shows a method of communicating the relative importance and tradeoffs 
among system parameters to support optimal parameter selection. The finding that a piece rate 
system is consistent with optimal decisions, however, is specific to the high-speed machining 
case considered. In particular, the system dynamics constraint interacts with the incentive to 
produce the result. Additional work is needed to explore the implications of this method in other 
systems with different properties from the one studied here. 
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The results presented in this work are important for the insights they provide as well as 
the directions for future work that they point to. The remainder of this chapter discusses some 
implications of the work and how these implications inspire ongoing research. Section 8.2 
examines the issue of characterizing distributions over future decision situations. Section 8.3 
explores the effects of individualized differences of decision makers in comparing incentive 
structures. Section 8.4 explains the implications of using frequentist heuristics for constructing 
probability beliefs. Section 8.5 poses questions about the interaction of effort and decision 
making as responses to incentives. Section 8.6 introduces the notion of multiple targets along a 
single attribute while concluding remarks are provided in Section 8.7. 
8.2.   Characterizing Future Decision Situations 
An important component of setting targets or incentive structures in general, is the role 
that uncertain future events will play in determining final performance measures. The future 
decision alternatives that will be available to the manager are unknown at the time the 
organization sets the incentive structure meaning that incentives must be set based on beliefs 
about future events. The work presented in Chapters 3 and 4, and elsewhere in the literature 
(Hupman and Abbas 2014) underscores the need to have information about relevant probability 
distributions of these future events in order to set targets intelligently. Future work is required to 
provide a more detailed analysis of how these distributions may be constructed as several 
potential approaches exist. 
One method to construct informed beliefs about the likelihood future decision situations 
is to institute policies that track and monitor current decisions.  Such policies may be 
implemented, for example, as part of decision support software that helps managers make sense 
of available data, identify the relevant uncertainties, and construct probability distributions for 
the alternatives in a given decision situation.  If the software maintains a record of these 
distributions and the characteristics of the decision situation, a database can be constructed to 
inform the organization about the types of decisions being made.  
Another method of constructing these probability distributions is to identify stores of 
existing data about past decision situations.  Some industries such as the financial sector deal in 
uncertain outcomes regularly and have records of past investments and outcomes. Additionally, 
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databases of financial data on a variety of investment instruments are maintained. Another area 
where relevant data may be obtainable is in supply chain management. Supply chains require 
many decisions to be made at different points, and there is an inherent stochastic nature in the 
system.  
Future work in this area requires the development of industry partnerships to develop and 
implement or to identify decision support software that can be used. These partnerships are also 
required in order to access historical data.  Through these partnerships, it should be possible to 
improve the operations of industry and simultaneously contribute to the academic literature in 
the area.   
8.3.   The Effects of Individual Differences in Comparing Incentives 
A challenge in comparing the effectiveness of target-based incentives to non-target or 
outcome-based incentives is the role that individual preferences play. The behavioral 
experiments of Chapter 6 show that while target-based decision making may be predicted based 
on the properties of the decision alternatives and the target, predicting outcome based decisions 
requires knowledge about the decision maker’s risk attitude. In order to compare the effects of a 
target-based incentive to an outcome based incentive, it is necessary to specify the distribution of 
risk attitudes across the decision makers in addition to specifying the probability distributions 
over the future decision situations.  
This dependence of an outcome based incentive on individual preferences raises 
questions about what types of risk attitudes are present at different levels in an organization’s 
hierarchy. It also raises questions about whether there are trends within industries that can be 
used to inform an organization about the likely risk attitudes of its employees.  
8.4.   Implications of Frequentist Heuristics 
In practice, one way that beliefs about probability are constructed is by observing what 
outcomes have occurred in the past. This representation of uncertainty is replicated in the 
behavioral experiments by representing decision alternatives by a set of previous outcomes. The 
results indicate that when faced with a fixed target based incentive, decision makers may use a 
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frequency based heuristic to select between alternatives. In this heuristic, decision makers count 
the number of outcomes that exceed the target and select the alternative with the higher number.   
 If decision makers rely on a frequentist approach in target-based decision making, it is 
important to consider the implications of this heuristic when determining whether and how to set 
a target. In particular, given two decision alternatives with probability distributions over possible 
outcomes, the likelihood that one will be picked over the other is a function of the number of 
observed samples from each distribution and the likelihood of one of the samples having a larger 
number of observations that is greater than the target. This likelihood can be calculated using 
binomial distributions in which the parameter p is determined by the probability that a sample 
drawn from one of the distributions is greater than the target.   
8.5.   The Confluence of Decision Making and Effort 
The work presented in these chapters has focused on the effect of incentives on decision 
making behavior. However, in practice, incentives are likely to affect both effort and decision 
making simultaneously. Consider, for example, an experiment reported by Knight et al. (2001) in 
which a video game is used to examine the effect of goals on teamwork. Teams with higher goals 
tended to exert higher effort and also tended to pick riskier strategies. The results show that goals 
can affect both effort and decisions, making it difficult to tease out the individual effects of effort 
and decisions and highlighting the complexities involved in the study of incentives.  
 Additional work is needed to characterize the relationship between effort and decision 
making on improved performance. It is possible, for example, that decision makers who exert 
higher effort identify more decision alternatives for consideration. In the simulation model, this 
effect would be modeled by a variable that links effort levels to the number of decision 
alternatives generated. The appropriate linking mechanism to use requires additional study, as 
well as exploration of what other factors should be considered. 
8.6.   Multiple Targets Over a Single Attribute 
In the treatment of targets, it has been assumed that either a single target exists over a 
single attribute, or that multiple targets exist across multiple attributes.  In each case, only one 
target exists for each attribute. But extensions are possible in which multiple targets exist. 
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Consider, for example, the case of a worker who believes s/he must meet a minimum 
performance threshold in order to maintain her/his job. This worker also knows that performance 
above a certain level will result in a large bonus. In this case, two targets exist across a single 
attribute.  
The case of multiple attributes changes the effective utility function of the decision maker. 
Instead of being a 0-1 step function, the utility becomes a 0-X-1 step function in which steps 
occur at each target and the step at the first target is from 0 to X. The magnitude of X depends on 
the preferences of the decision maker and is defined by the preference probability in a standard 
gamble in which one outcome is attaining the high target and the other outcome is failure to 
attain the low target.  
This scenario is a generalization of target-based decision making and can conceivably be 
extended to any number of targets.  
8.7.   Conclusion 
The overall research goal of this work has been to bring greater clarity to the 
understanding of how targets affect decision making and how targets should be set to optimize 
decision making.  The presented research is an important step in closing the gap of understanding 
about how much is enough when setting a target.  
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APPENDIX A:  
THE EXPECTED VALUE GAP FOR AN INDEPENDENT TARGET 
 
 
Part 1: Calculating the Expected Value Gap 
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Note that the integral 
2
1 1
2
2 2
min
2 2
1 2 2 2,
( )
( ) ( , )
D
f d d
 
 
  
       reverses the bounds of integration over 
the mean, and also reverses the subtraction of the means in the integrand. These two sign 
changes cancel each other, and one obtains results analogous to the above expression. Summing 
the two terms, one obtains 
       
2 2 2 3 3 4 4
max min max min max min1
2 2
1 1
2
.
2 3 4
T      
   
   
  
    
 
The other two integrals from Figure A.1 only differ from the above two integrals in the bounds 
over the variance. However, because the mean and variance are independent in this case, the 
same results will be obtained for these integrals as the first two. 
Next, the probability that the mean of the first project is greater or less than the target is 
determined as 
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for the independent and uniformly distributed project means.  
These probabilities must be multiplied by the conditional expected utility for each case to obtain 
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       . 
One must next integrate over the first project, 1  and 
2
1 ,  to obtain the unconditional expected 
value gap, 
 
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Because the expressions for 1  and 
2
1 are independent of each other, the above integral can be 
evaluated by evaluating the separate integrals: 
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Combining the above calculations gives the following expression for the expected value gap, 
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where V is a constant that is determined by the bounds of the distribution over 2.  It is 
calculated as 
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Part 2: Proof of optimal target for the individual independent target 
This section gives the proof that the fixed target that minimizes the expected value gap is given 
by  
max min*
2
T
 
                       (A.1) 
in the case of a risk neutral company that rewards a division for reaching a fixed target where the 
division selects from a set of two projects with uncertain payoffs. The payoffs are normally 
distributed with mean   and variance 2.  The project means and variances are independent and 
identically distributed with uniform distributions on the domains 
min max
[ ,    and 2 2
min max
[ , .    
An equation for the expected value gap in terms of the fixed target has been calculated 
previously, 
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(A.2) 
where V is a constant that is determined by the bounds of the distribution over 2.  It is 
calculated as  
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To determine the location of the target that minimizes the expected value gap, one takes the 
derivative of (A.2) with respect to the target, 
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3 3
dE VG T
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dT
              (A.4) 
It will be shown that (A.4) has one root, that this root is the global minimum of (A.2), and that 
this root is equal to (A.1).  
To show the existence of exactly one root, the properties of cubic functions are used. For a cubic 
function of the form 
3 2( ) ,f x ax bx cx d    with 0a  , the discriminant is 
3 2 2 3 2 28 4 4 27abcd b d b c ac a d        
and can be used to determine the nature of the roots (Irving, 2004). Three cases exist and are as 
follows. 
     The equation has three distinct roots. 
     The equation has a multiple root, and its roots are real. 
     The equation has one real root and two non-real, complex conjugate roots. 
 
It is now shown that the discriminant of (A.4) is negative. In this case, the cubic function 
coefficients are given in Table A.1. 
Table A.1. Polynomial coefficients of 
(A.3) 
a 83  
b max min4(     
c   
2 2
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4(  
 
d 
3 3
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4 (
3
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The following calculations are performed to determine the discriminant, 
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All the terms are expanded to obtain 
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By factoring, one obtains 
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which is always negative, proving that (A.4) has one real root. 
To show that this root is the minimum value of (A.2), it will be shown that the second derivative 
of (A.2) is always positive. The second derivative is 
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It is shown that 
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by showing that the minimum value of (A.6) is greater than zero. The minimum value of (A.6) is 
found by 
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with the solution, 
 max min .
2
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   (A.8) 
The second derivative test shows that (A.8) is indeed a minimum,  
 
4
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The value of the second derivative at the minimum is 
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Thus, it is shown that (A.2) has one real root, and that this root is a minimum. 
The value T at which the minimum occurs is determined by solving for the value of the root to 
the cubic function given by (A.4). The solution to the cubic function has been derived in several 
ways (Guilbeau, 1930). For the case in which one real root exists, denoted 
1
,x  an expression for 
that root is (Press and Vetterling, 1992)  
 0
1
1
3
x b C
a C
  
   
 
  (A.11) 
where 
2 3
1 1 03
4
2
C
    
 , 
2
0
3b ac  
, and 
3 2
1
2 9 27b abc a d   
. 
These expressions are filled in with the cubic polynomial coefficients from Table A.1 to 
calculate the following, 
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Filling these expressions into (A.11), one obtains  
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 
 
 
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1 max min max min
max min
max min
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4 4
3 8 4
1
   4 4
8
x
 
   
 
 
    
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
  
  
 max min
1
2
x
 
   (A.15) 
which equals (A.1) and completes the proof.  
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APPENDIX B: BEHAVIORAL EXPERIMENT DOCUMENTS 
 
Appendix B.1: Recruitment Email 
 
This portion of the appendix contains the email used to recruit participants for the behavioral 
experiment.  
 
Subject line: Research Participation Invitation: A Survey about Decision Making 
Body:  
You are invited to participate in a paid research study that involves a 45 minute survey.  
Purpose: The purpose of this research is to gain a better understanding of people’s preferences 
for uncertain outcomes when an incentive structure is present.  This work will contribute to 
models of decision making that will ultimately help in the creation of systems to support good 
decision making.  
Procedures: A 45 minute survey that asks questions about your preferences for uncertain 
outcomes when a reward is tied to the outcome. 
Compensation: $15 guaranteed, and the possibility of an additional bonus payment  
Participation: Participation is voluntary. In order to participate, you must be at least 18 years old 
and have completed at least a 200-level probability or statistics class at the University of Illinois. 
Contact: If you are interested in participating, please email Andrea Hupman at 
hupman1@illinois.edu.  
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Appendix B.2: Risk Aversion Assessment 
 
 
Introduction and Warm-Up Questions 
This survey will ask questions about your preferences for different uncertain deals.  
 
It consists of 3 parts: 
 Part 1: 19 questions that are a choice between 2 deals 
 Part 2: 16 questions that are a choice between 2 deals 
 Part 3: 5 short demographic questions 
 
Let’s start with a few introductory questions to get you thinking about uncertainty. 
 
 
 
 
For example, if someone offered you the deal below for free, would you accept it? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please circle one. 
 
Accept deal.   Reject deal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DEAL 1 
50% Chance Gain $10 
50% Chance   Lose $5 
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Now, consider dollar amounts other than $10. Is there an amount of money (X) that would make 
you just indifferent between accepting the deal below? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
What amount $X makes you just indifferent to the deal? __________________________ 
(Just indifferent means that you are neither happy nor unhappy with the deal. You feel the same 
about taking the deal or walking away from it.)   
 
 
 
Now, suppose the probabilities aren’t 50/50 and you have to pay for the deal. 
 
What is the MOST you would be willing to pay for the deal below? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Please write the MOST you would be willing to pay: $__________________________ 
  
DEAL 2 
50% Chance Gain $X 
50% Chance   Lose $X/2 
DEAL 3 
70% Chance Obtain $500 
30% Chance   Obtain $0 
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Appendix B.3: Visual Representation of Uncertainty 
 
This portion of the appendix contains portion of the behavioral experiment that used a visual 
representation of uncertainty to examine target and non-target based decision making. For 
illustrative purposes, the lower variance alternative is always “Wheel A” in this appendix. The 
order of alternatives (i.e. whether the lower variance was on the left or the right) was randomized 
for the paper based surveys used in the experiment.  
 
Part 1 Instructions 
The next 19 questions are about a choice between two wheels like those shown below. 
 
The likelihood of an outcome is proportional to its size on the wheel. 
 
Each question will have one of two possible payment types. 
Type 1. Outcome Based: Payment equals the outcome of a spin of the wheel you pick.  
Type 2. Target Based: Payment is $10 if the outcome of a spin of the wheel you pick is equal to 
or greater than a target. 
 
At the end of the survey, one of the questions you answered will be played for real. The wheel 
you selected will be spun, and you will receive a bonus payment based on the result. 
 
If you have any questions now, or at any point during the survey, please ask the assessor.  
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Question 1 
 
 
Please circle one. 
 
Wheel A   Wheel B 
 
 
 
 
Question 2 
 
 
Please circle one. 
 
Wheel A   Wheel B 
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Question 3 
 
 
Please circle one. 
 
Wheel A   Wheel B 
 
 
Question 4 
 
 
Please circle one. 
 
Wheel A   Wheel B 
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Question 5 
 
Please circle one. 
 
Wheel A  Indifferent  Wheel B 
 
 
Question 6 
 
Please circle one. 
 
Wheel A  Indifferent  Wheel B 
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Question 7 
 
Please circle one. 
 
Wheel A  Indifferent  Wheel B 
 
 
Question 8 
 
 
Please circle one. 
 
Wheel A  Indifferent  Wheel B 
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Question 9 
 
Please circle one. 
 
Wheel A  Indifferent  Wheel B 
 
 
Question 10 
 
 
Please circle one. 
 
Wheel A  Indifferent  Wheel B 
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Question 11 
 
Please circle one. 
 
Wheel A   Wheel B 
 
 
Question 12 
 
 
Please circle one. 
 
Wheel A  Indifferent  Wheel B 
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Question 13 
 
 
Please circle one. 
 
Wheel A  Indifferent  Wheel B 
 
 
Question 14 
 
 
Please circle one. 
 
Wheel A  Indifferent  Wheel B 
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Question 15 
 
 
Please circle one. 
 
Wheel A   Wheel B 
 
 
Question 16 
 
 
Please circle one. 
 
Wheel A   Wheel B 
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Question 17 
 
 
Please circle one. 
 
Wheel A  Indifferent  Wheel B 
 
 
Question 18 
 
 
Please circle one. 
 
Wheel A  Indifferent  Wheel B 
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Question 19 
 
 
Please circle one. 
 
Wheel A  Indifferent  Wheel B 
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Appendix B.4: Sample Set Representation of Uncertainty 
 
This portion of the appendix contains portion of the behavioral experiment that used a sample set 
representation of uncertainty to examine target and non-target based decision making. For 
illustrative purposes, the lower variance alternative is always “Wheel A” in this appendix. The 
order of alternatives (i.e. whether the lower variance was on the left or the right) was randomized 
for the paper based surveys used in the experiment.  
 
Part 2 Instructions 
The next 16 questions are also about a choice between two alternatives with uncertain outcomes. 
Instead of being shown a wheel, you are shown a list of the previous outcomes for each 
alternative. For example, you will see two lists like those below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Each question will have one of two possible payment types. 
Type 1. Outcome Based: Payment equals the next outcome from the chosen alternative.  
Type 2. Target Based: Payment is $10 if the next outcome from the chosen alternative is equal to 
or greater than a target value.  
 
If you have any questions now, or at any point during the survey, please ask the assessor.  
 
 
 
Choice A 
5.2 
3.4 
9 
Choice B 
5.1 
4.5 
7 
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Refer to A and B below for questions 1-4. Please circle your selection for each question. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Which alternative do you prefer if the payment is… 
 
1. Outcome based: Payment equals the next outcome. 
Choice A     Choice B 
 
2. Target based: $10 payment is made if the next outcome is equal to, or greater than, the target. 
Choice A  Indifferent  Choice B 
 
 
3. Target based: $10 payment is made if the next outcome is equal to, or greater than, the target. 
Choice A  Indifferent  Choice B 
 
 
4. Target based: $10 payment is made if the next outcome is equal to, or greater than, the target. 
Choice A  Indifferent  Choice B 
 
Choice A 
13.30 
9.38 
9.80 
8.56 
12.52 
11.15 
9.86 
9.68 
8.39 
9.00 
Target 
9.5 
Choice B 
11.76 
7.44 
10.02 
6.89 
10.40 
9.60 
9.90 
10.21 
6.30 
9.10 
Target 
10.0 
Target 
10.5 
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Refer to A and B below for questions 5-8. Please circle your selection for each question. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Which alternative do you prefer if the payment is… 
 
5. Outcome based: Payment equals the next outcome. 
Choice A     Choice B 
 
6. Target based: $10 payment is made if the next outcome is equal to, or greater than, the target. 
Choice A  Indifferent  Choice B 
 
 
7. Target based: $10 payment is made if the next outcome is equal to, or greater than, the target. 
Choice A  Indifferent  Choice B 
 
 
8. Target based: $10 payment is made if the next outcome is equal to, or greater than, the target. 
Choice A  Indifferent  Choice B 
 
Choice A 
11.32 
7.38 
9.31 
12.67 
11.54 
10.93 
6.96 
11.99 
7.89 
8.98 
Target 
9.0 
Choice B 
9.53 
4.82 
9.92 
10.04 
9.54 
9.89 
5.33 
9.99 
5.71 
7.55 
Target 
9.5 
Target 
10.0 
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Refer to A and B below for questions 9-12. Please circle your selection for each question. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Which alternative do you prefer if the payment is… 
 
9. Outcome based: Payment equals the next outcome. 
Choice A     Choice B 
 
10. Target based: $10 payment is made if the next outcome is equal to, or greater than, the target. 
Choice A  Indifferent  Choice B 
 
 
11. Target based: $10 payment is made if the next outcome is equal to, or greater than, the target. 
Choice A  Indifferent  Choice B 
 
 
12. Target based: $10 payment is made if the next outcome is equal to, or greater than, the target. 
Choice A  Indifferent  Choice B 
 
Choice A 
9.73 
8.65 
9.12 
12.49 
10.74 
10.92 
9.96 
10.05 
10.53 
10.34 
Target 
9.5 
Choice B 
8.41 
4.40 
5.28 
16.75 
12.35 
12.99 
8.85 
10.20 
12.09 
11.16 
Target 
10.0 
Target 
10.5 
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Refer to A and B below for questions 13-16. Please circle your selection for each question. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Which alternative do you prefer if the payment is… 
 
13. Outcome based: Payment equals the next outcome. 
Choice A     Choice B 
 
14. Target based: $10 payment is made if the next outcome is equal to, or greater than, the target. 
Choice A  Indifferent  Choice B 
 
 
15. Target based: $10 payment is made if the next outcome is equal to, or greater than, the target. 
Choice A  Indifferent  Choice B 
 
 
16. Target based: $10 payment is made if the next outcome is equal to, or greater than, the target. 
Choice A  Indifferent  Choice B 
Choice A 
10.68 
8.38 
8.12 
9.91 
9.32 
11.54 
10.16 
8.82 
10.03 
10.02 
Target 
9.5 
Choice B 
14.84 
3.90 
4.12 
9.96 
7.01 
18.68 
11.85 
5.82 
10.44 
10.38 
Target 
10.0 
Target 
10.5 
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Appendix B.5: Supplemental Questions 
 
This portion of the appendix contains the supplemental questions in the behavioral experiment 
that were asked following the completion of the experimental questions.  
 
A Few Wrap-Up Questions 
 
Please indicate your agreement with the following statement. 
 
1. I clearly understood each question. 
 
Strongly disagree   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly agree 
 
 
The following questions are for classification purposes only. 
2. Please indicate your gender:  M  F 
 
3. Please indicate your age: ___________________ 
 
 
4. How many probability, statistics, or stochastic processes courses  
have you taken at UIUC (include courses you are currently enrolled in)? ____________ 
 
 
5. Please indicate your GPA to the nearest tenth ____________________ 
 
